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Abstract 
 
This research focuses on theories of interreligious dialogue and Muslim-Christian 
dialogue specifically. The aim is to examine whether Legenhausen’s non-reductive 
religious pluralism, rooted in Shi’a theology, is a successful solution to the problem of 
difference involved in Hick’s (reductive) hypothesis. Such a study is important 
because it investigates what types of theories of interreligious relations are 
“difference-respecting” in the sense that they are capable of recognizing the 
significance of religious and cultural differences as invaluable resources for interfaith 
dialogue. The research approach adopted is a critical analysis of the relevant 
literature, undertaken from a philosophical/phenomenological perspective. The 
findings are that Legenhausen’s position does not solve the problem of difference to 
a satisfying degree because a) it is based on inclusivist thinking and thus faces the 
charge of spiritual superiority and b) by excusing differences between Muslim and 
Christian beliefs by reference to the concept of qasir (incapability), it does not take 
otherness seriously, which makes it even more reductive than classical pluralisms. 
The main conclusion is that a truly egalitarian account of religions, sensitive to issues 
of difference, needs to bridge the gulf between objective observer perspectives 
(adopted by pluralists) and insider views on interfaith issues (promoted by religiously 
specific approaches like Legenhausen’s). As an alternative theory it is therefore 
recommended to combine the best of both approaches into a (religiously non-
specific) model of witnessing, based on minimal ethical pluralism. 
 
Keywords: interreligious dialogue, Muslim-Christian relations, religious pluralism, 
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Chapter 1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
‘Religion can be a source of discord. It can also be a form of conflict resolution. We 
are familiar with the former; the second is far too little tried. Yet, it is here, if anywhere, 
that hope must lie if we are to create a human solidarity strong enough to bear the 
strains that lie ahead. […] That will require great courage, and perhaps something 
more than courage: a candid admission that, more than at any time in the past, we 
need to search – each faith in its own way – for a way of living with, and 
acknowledging the integrity of, those who are not of our faith. Can we make space for 
difference?’ (Sacks, 2003, 4-5, my emphasis) 
 
1.1. Background 
Constructive interfaith dialogue, in particular between Christians and Muslims, is not 
a new phenomenon. At various times in history and in very diverse contexts, religious 
leaders, scholars and laypeople of both faith traditions have engaged in interreligious 
exchanges, furthering tolerance, trust and mutual understanding. Classical examples 
of such Christian conciliatory approaches towards Islam, as Bennett specifies in 
Understanding Christian-Muslim Relations (2008), are the Nestorian Mar Timothy in 
the eighth century CE; a number of works and letters written around the time of the 
crusades (Lull, Bacon, Assisi); and in the modern era, Gairdner’s and Massignon’s 
theological perspectives (Bennett, 2008, 89-113). Similarly, Bennett claims, classical 
Muslim approaches aimed at conciliation with Christians are found in Muhammad’s 
encounters with followers of the Christian faith as reported in the Hadiths; in the 
works of Arabi in the classical medieval period; and in Khan’s modern view on the 
possibility of Muslim-Christian friendship (Bennett, 2008, 138-162). Today, however, 
increasing global interconnectedness, on the one hand, and a growing awareness of 
religious and cultural diversity at local levels, on the other – especially in Western 
societies – has made the promotion of mutual knowledge even more essential. 
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Drawing on Cantwell Smith’s Towards a World Theology (1981), King argues, for 
example, that the current shift from regional identity-formation to our global 
interdependence in not only economic and political, but also spiritual matters ‘sets the 
challenging task of how we can meaningfully learn from each other in mutuality and 
trust’ in this postmodern age (King, 1998, 41). 
 
The theoretical framework, on which Western theological discourses on Christianity’s 
relationship with other faiths are commonly based, is the tripartite model of 
exclusivism, inclusivism and religious pluralism introduced by Race in 1982. To 
understand the wider context out of which this research evolved, it is necessary to 
briefly define these concepts: Exclusivists such as Spencer or the Caner brothers on 
the Christian side and Deedat on the Muslim side claim that only their religion is true 
(e.g. leads to salvation) and that other religions are therefore misled (Spencer, 2003, 
2006; Caner and Caner, 2002; Deedat, 1981, 1984, 1990). Christian inclusivists like 
Rahner (1966), Cragg (2002, 2005), Jomier (2002) or Khodr (1981), by contrast, are 
convinced that other religions have salvific significance, but only by virtue of the 
hidden, unrecognized redemptive work of Christ in them. In other words, Christianity 
for them has a soteriological power stronger than that of other religions, thus being 
capable of including in its salvation members of other faiths whether they are aware 
of this or not. Although adopting a more conciliatory perspective on interfaith relations 
than exclusivists do, inclusivists therefore cannot rid themselves completely of the 
traditional claim of Christian superiority, so characteristic of exclusivism. Similar 
positions regarding the soteriological quality of Islam are found in contemporary 
Muslim thinkers like Askari (1991, 1992), Esack (1997), Hussain (2006) and Talbi 
(1990). It is important to realize, though, that the historical focus on clarifying one’s 
own position in relation to other religions stems from Western Enlightenment thought 
3 
 
when pioneers of comparative religion applied the methods of rational investigation 
first to the various Christian denominations and then to other religions (Harrison, 
1990). As Masuzawa therefore objects, Race’s threefold typology – like the concept 
of religion itself – could also be viewed as a Western Christian invention imposed 
onto other cultures as a hidden means to preserve ‘European universalism’ 
(Masuzawa, 2005).  
 
To distance themselves from this charge of Eurocentricism, numerous Western 
scholars of religion, especially those coming from liberal Protestantism, are now 
suggesting that increasing religious diversity in postmodern, democratic nation-states 
can only be met appropriately by a replacement of the traditional exclusivist and 
inclusivist approaches by the third and supposedly more egalitarian model of 
interreligious relations, religious pluralism, as promoted for example by Hick in An 
Interpretation of Religion (1989)1. Religious pluralism, according to Hick, is the view 
that all major religions are different ways of experiencing, and hence responding to, 
the Divine or, as he puts it, the ineffable Real. (Hick, 1973 [1996], 37-40; 1989, 99-
102). Religious traditions can therefore be seen as alternative soteriological spaces 
founded – despite their differences in belief and practice and irrespective of 
conflicting truth claims – on a common core: the goal of teaching people the way from 
self-centredness to ‘Reality-centredness’ (Hick, 1973 [1996]). As equally valuable 
fragments of the origin of the world, individual religions therefore have strong reasons 
to engage in dialogue, as equal partners or even members of one family (Hick, 1973, 
146). It is in response to this view of religions, so influential among proponents of 
                                                            
1 Examples of contemporary pluralist scholars influenced by Hick are Kaufmann, Knitter, Radford Ruether, King 
and Race. 
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interfaith dialogue today, especially within the developing field of the theology of 
religions, that the following discussion is to be understood. 
 
1.2. Research focus 
There are many objections to Hick’s pluralist hypothesis, some of which will be 
discussed briefly in Chapter 2. The primary research focus of this work, however, is a 
particular argumentative contradiction involved in religious pluralism – here referred 
to as “the problem of difference” – as well as a recent attempt at solving this problem: 
Legenhausen’s non-reductive corrective to Hick’s theory. The contradiction, to which 
MacIntyre (1985) et al.2 object can be summarized as follows: Hick’s pluralism can be 
accused of being reductive in two problematic ways. First, by reducing religious 
differences to the lowest common denominator (here: human striving for Reality-
centredness), it does not encourage genuine dialogue as it simply fails to take the 
theological, social and political significance of otherness seriously. Second, defining 
religious traditions as different human (cognitive or experiential) responses to the 
Real amounts to saying that religions are no more than human constructions whose 
respective particularities in belief, doctrine and practice are manmade and not willed 
by the Divine (Shah-Kazemi, 2006, 245-251). To solve this problem, American Shi’a 
Muslim Legenhausen proposes a non-reductive version of pluralism, rooted in Islamic 
theology, which (so he claims) ‘allow[s] for ultimately irreconcilable differences’ while 
providing, simultaneously, ‘motivation for tolerance’ (Legenhausen, 2006, 115). This 
is achieved by pointing to the principle shared by both Shi’a Islam and Catholic 
Christianity that no one can place any limit on the extent of the grace of God 
(Legenhausen, 2006, 115). The reason why I have chosen to focus on this particular 
theory of interreligious relations is that there seems to be some confusion within 
                                                            
2 See MacGrane (1989), Tracy (1994), Byrne (1995) and Sacks (2003). 
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academic circles about the extent to which this view is really distinct from inclusivist 
interpretations of religion. Thus, Barnes notes in his chapter on pluralism in The 
Routledge Companion to the Study of Religion (2010): 
 
‘Non-reductive pluralism, as he [Legenhausen] calls it, comes close to what Christians 
have recently retrieved from an earlier tradition: that it is possible for a person to be 
saved by the grace of God even though what either tradition would uphold as the 
strict obligations of faith and practice are not fulfilled’ (Barnes in Hinnells, 2010, 436-
437). 
 
However, without having elaborated any further on this apparent link between 
Legenhausen’s position and inclusivism, and without having proposed an alternative 
non-reductive theory himself, Barnes concludes his chapter with the following lines:  
 
‘The pluralist move […] does little more than impose an artificial unity on an area of 
human endeavor and interaction which steadfastly resists such reduction […] A 
dialogical non-reductive pluralism, which takes the truths and values of different faith 
communities with the utmost seriousness […] may offer a better way forward’ (Barnes 
in Hinnells, 2010, 438). 
 
Given the importance of finding constructive ways of engaging with people from other 
religions in this increasingly pluralistic world, it is my aim to clarify whether this ‘way 
forward’, apparently provided by non-reductive pluralism, can really be viewed as a 
sign of progress or rather, as I shall object, as an old route with a new name, leading 
back into inclusivist claims of spiritual superiority. 
 
1.3. Reflexivity 
With a research topic as emotionally subjective as interreligious relations, I think it 
necessary to say a few words about my own spiritual background. The greatest  
identifiable influence on my academic perspective on interfaith issues is my Quaker 
belief in “That of God in everyone” – a notion deriving from George Fox, the founder 
of Quakerism, whose potential implications for Christian-Muslim dialogue will be 
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considered in Chapter 5. A common interpretation of this statement, which I agree 
upon, is that ‘there is literally a bit of God dwelling inside of every human being’, 
regardless of which particular spiritual path, if any, the latter may follow 
(aboutquakers.org). Like Hick, I would therefore entertain the idea that all religions 
are equally valid paths to the same ultimate Reality, expected to enter into dialogue 
as equal partners. At the same time, however, I am convinced that this metaphysical 
theory – religious pluralism – is not a good basis for interfaith dialogue per se 
because it ignores what is of utmost importance to those actually participating in 
interreligious exchanges: the particular beliefs, including truth claims, and practices of 
the respective traditions. Therefore, although sympathetic to it myself, I do not see 
religious pluralism as a universally applicable theory to be made normative in 
dialogue situations. 
 
To approach the topic of interfaith dialogue as objectively as possible, I have 
therefore chosen to analyze both the problem of difference involved in pluralism and 
Legenhausen’s potential solution to it from a philosophical/phenomenological 
perspective. This entails two main methodological decisions: First, by means of what 
is commonly known as “phenomenological antireductionism”, I am seeking to free my 
own viewpoint from uncritical preconceptions concealing the uniqueness of religious 
phenomena such as the experiential significance of adhering to exclusivist truth 
claims. Second, it is my aim to adopt a phenomenological epoqué in that I bracket, as 
far as possible, my own Quaker beliefs about the universality of religious belief and 
the ethical value of pluralist interpretations of religion. The chosen focus on the 
significance of difference may hence be seen as a first step to achieve this goal.  
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1.4. Overall research aim and individual research objectives 
The overall aim of this research is to advance understanding of the role and 
significance of issues of difference (differences in belief, doctrine or practice; different 
senses of religious or cultural identity) within interfaith relations and Christian-Muslim 
relations specifically. Given the philosophical potential of this research topic, I have 
chosen to concentrate, primarily, on the theoretical framework, from which ideas of 
universality and particularity emerge – contemporary theories of religious pluralism, 
with a particular focus on Legenhausen’s non-reductive position. This has led me to 
the following two main research questions: Is Legenhausen’s non-reductive religious 
pluralism an acceptable corrective to Hick’s pluralism (in that it embraces the 
significance of difference within interreligious relations)? And if so: does this make it a 
recommendable theoretical basis for Muslim-Christian3 dialogue (e.g. in Western 
contexts) today? To answer these questions, a number of individual research 
objectives – like premises in a complex argument – will guide us through the 
discussion. These objectives are: 
 
 to summarize and examine pluralist positions, both as approaches to interfaith 
dialogue and as concepts of religion, concentrating particularly on Hick’s 
pluralist hypothesis and its implications for the study of religions. 
 to identify and evaluate critically objections against such pluralist positions, 
especially the problem of difference involved in Hick’s pluralism. 
                                                            
3 NB: The terms “Christian‐Muslim“ and “Muslim‐Christian” dialogue are used synonymously in this thesis, with 
the  sole  difference  that, whenever  the  theory  under  consideration  is written  from  an  identifiable  religious 
perspective  (Shi’a  Islam  in  Legenhausen’s  case),  I  have  chosen  to  put  that  particular  tradition  in  the  first 
position. However, it is my conviction that interfaith dialogue always involves a two‐way relationship in which 
both  members  are,  or  should  be,  equal  partners.  Therefore,  naming  Islam  or  Christianity  first,  in  these 
instances, does not hint at any personal preference. 
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 to introduce Legenhausen’s non-reductive pluralism as a possible solution to 
this problem and hence, a potential corrective to Hick’s position. 
 to examine the extent to which this Islamic version of pluralism differs from 
Christian inclusivism and its tendency towards claims of spiritual superiority. 
 to formulate recommendations on interfaith issues such as the promotion of a 
specific model for interfaith dialogue, sensitive to issues of difference. 
 
At the risk of oversimplification of the purpose and value of each of these steps, it 
may be worth noting that objectives 1 - 3 focus primarily on reasons and emerging 
issues, whereas it is in steps 4 and 5 that this research will make contributions to the 
field of interfaith dialogue. It is important to realize, though, that these individual 
objectives are not separate unrelated tasks, but should be seen as research activities 
that are necessarily interlinked. Thus, the first three objectives enhance 
understanding of the significance of issues of universality and particularity within 
interreligious relations (and the tension that exists between them) thereby building a 
basis for later conclusions and recommendations made with regard to contemporary 
dialogue situations. 
 
This research project hopes to contribute to the development of the field of interfaith 
dialogue in a number of ways: Firstly, by providing a critical review of issues pertinent 
to dialogue situations between Christians and Muslims, including questions such as: 
How can the need for recognition of both similarities and differences be balanced 
effectively? What theoretical bases to do so are there? Secondly, by critically 
examining precisely those models that are commonly understood as means to further 
constructive dialogue (interpreted as a voluntary practice aimed at conciliation and 
the furthering of mutual trust and understanding). And thirdly, by formulating 
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recommendations on how Christian-Muslim dialogue, intent on recognizing the 
significance of difference within interreligious relations, may be conducted 
successfully, especially with regard to the pressing issues of globalization and 
plurality in this postmodern age. 
 
1.5. Outline structure 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter provides important background information on the history of constructive 
dialogue between Christians and Muslims and contemporary theories of engaging 
with people from other faiths in increasingly globalized contexts. The focus of this 
research is discussed and justified and the overall research aim and individual 
research objectives are identified. 
 
Chapter 2: Issues and review of related literature 
This chapter examines literature essential to understanding the relation between 
religious diversity and contemporary theories of interfaith dialogue. Thus, it provides 
detailed information on the impact of religious pluralism on interfaith issues, 
concentrating particularly on Hick’s hypothesis as well as on common objections 
raised to it by contemporary scholars of philosophy and religion. The problem of 
difference as the main focus of this thesis is introduced and a first consideration of 
Legenhausen’s solution is included. 
 
Chapter 3: Religious pluralism and the problem of difference within 
interreligious relations 
This chapter elaborates further on the problem of difference as a crucial criticism 
against religious pluralism. Specifically, the views of Van der Ven, Masuzawa and 
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Sacks are considered as influential representatives of this line of argumentation, 
leading us to the question of whether other perspectives on interreligious relations, 
unwilling to reduce differences to the lowest common denominator, might be better 
theoretical bases for interfaith dialogue. 
 
Chapter 4: Legenhausen’s non-reductive corrective to Hick’s pluralist 
hypothesis: A sound solution to the problem of difference? 
This chapter investigates the extent to which Legenhausen’s non-reductive pluralism 
is a successful solution to the problem of difference. Here, a particular focus is on the 
question of whether this form of pluralism is really distinct from inclusivist 
interpretations of religions and their inherent tendency towards claims of spiritual 
superiority. 
 
Chapter 5: Alternative approaches to Muslim-Christian dialogue: Towards a 
(religiously non-specific) model of witnessing 
This chapter considers two alternative, religiously specific, views on interreligious 
relations found in Sufi universalism and Quakerism (and their interpretations of the 
principles of tawhid and “That of God in everyone” respectively). The aim is to clarify 
whether such spiritual insights may serve as conceptual frameworks for constructive 
interfaith dialogue today. The chapter closes with a brief sketch of another, religiously 
non-specific, model for interfaith dialogue, based on the idea of witnessing, promoted 
here as a partial solution to the problem of difference. 
 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
This chapter revisits the overall aim and specific objectives of this research project. 
The findings are summarized and related to the individual research objectives. 
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Conclusions from this research work are derived and linked to the individual 
objectives; and based on these conclusions, recommendations on interfaith issues (in 
particular, dialogue situations between Christians and Muslims) are made. 
 
Chapter 7: References 
This chapter contains an alphabetical listing of the sources referred to in this work. 
The APA (American Psychological Association) system of referencing is used. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
Issues and review of related literature 
 
2.1. Introduction 
This literature review will examine the main issues surrounding the emergence of 
religious pluralism – in particular Hick’s pluralist hypothesis – as a theory of 
interreligious relations; objections commonly raised against Hick by contemporary 
scholars of philosophy and religion; the problem of difference involved in Hick’s 
pluralism; as well as issues essential to dialogue situations (here: between Christians 
and Muslims) that emerge from these considerations. The study within this review of 
literature focuses on objectives 1, 2 and 3 as set out in subsection 1.4. of the 
introductory chapter (the fourth objective will be met through the vehicle of critical 
analysis of Legenhausen’s position in chapter 4; while the final objective will be 
derived in chapter 5 as a result of the findings from objectives 1 - 4).  
 
By exploring these areas of literature, a significant contribution will be made to this 
research. The relationship between religious diversity (e.g. in Western plural 
societies) and pluralist interpretations of religion, especially when understood as 
theoretical frameworks for interfaith dialogue, will be evaluated. Additionally, serious 
problems involved in pluralist concepts of religion, such as the apparent need to 
reduce, for the sake of unity, important differences in belief, doctrine and practice to 
the lowest common denominator, will be assessed. Then, Legenhausen’s argument 
for an Islamic non-reductive pluralism will be introduced as a potential solution to the 
problem of difference; and emerging questions such as the relation of this form of 
pluralism to inclusivist approaches to Christian-Muslim dialogue will be considered, 
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thus preparing the way for the closer examination of these topics in chapter 4. The 
value of studying the aforementioned literature areas is to provide, in a structured 
way, meaningful discussion of the role and significance of issues of difference in 
contemporary interreligious dialogue situations. Thus, it is hoped that, at the end of 
this chapter, a critical understanding of key issues is exhibited and that there will 
emerge a clear focus for further research in the field of non-reductive pluralism. In the 
first instance, a sensible starting point is to investigate how religious pluralism is 
defined and what versions may be identified. 
 
2.2. Identifying types of religious pluralism 
The meaning of the term “religious pluralism” is complex. When employed in a purely 
descriptive sense, for example, it is sometimes used synonymously with the idea of 
religious diversity or plurality. In this case, Barnes claims, it refers to what is 
perceived as ‘`religiously other´ within a given social context’ (Barnes in Hinnells, 
2010, 426). Ever since the 1980s, however, the term has developed an additional 
connotation. More often than not, Barnes explains, the term is now used normatively 
‘to refer to a specific stance in philosophy and theology, associated with the name of 
John Hick and the thinkers of what might be called the `Myth of Christian 
Uniqueness´ school (a project developed in Hick and Knitter 1987 with an important 
set of counter-proposals in D’Costa 1990a4)’ (Barnes in Hinnells, 2010, 426). This 
theory, put in its simplest form, ‘states that all religions are equally valid paths to the 
same transcendent reality’ (Barnes in Hinnells, 2010, 426). Instead of merely 
describing a certain state of affairs – e.g. the fact that a given population consists of 
various ethnic groups – this sense of pluralism therefore prescribes (rather than 
describes) how issues of diversity are to be approached from a particular viewpoint, 
                                                            
4 This source is found in the bibliography as D’Costa (1990). 
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here: Western liberalism. To avoid unnecessary confusion, however, I shall 
distinguish strictly between these two meanings, using the expression “plurality” or 
“diversity” when employing the term in its descriptive sense and “pluralism” only when 
referring to the particular philosophical concept under consideration here. 
 
Furthermore, there are different types of pluralism and different ways of 
distinguishing between them. D’Costa identifies unitary pluralism (exemplified most 
notably by Hick), ethical pluralism (Knitter, Pieris, Radford Ruether) and pluriform 
pluralism (Panikkar, Heim and Placher) as the three main existing forms of pluralism 
(D’Costa, 2009). The aim of unitary pluralism, according to this categorization, is to 
articulate an essential unity between the world religions by showing that they all 
share common beliefs (e.g. about the purpose of life), even if they are expressed, 
experienced and practiced in different ways (D’Costa, 2009, 5). Ethical pluralism, in 
contrast, is more pragmatic in that it sees religions primarily as bearers of certain 
ethical codes aimed at the realization of practical human goals such as social justice 
or environmental protection5 (D’Costa, 2009, 6). And finally, proponents of pluriform 
pluralisms do not see truth – in the context of religion – as unitary, but pluriform in the 
sense that all religious traditions, albeit unable to ever possess the whole truth, have 
some of it, thus being capable of transforming the others, e.g. by speaking to them on 
their own terms (D’Costa, 2009, 14). Regarding the third category, Morris objects, 
however, that it is inappropriate to group together such diverse approaches to 
theological thinking about other religions because Heim and Placher clearly depart 
from the classical pluralisms of Hick and Panikkar and should hence be discussed 
separately (Morris, 2013, 87). Panikkar’s pluralism, Morris claims, is still rather close 
                                                            
5 Other ethical pluralists, not mentioned by D’Costa, are Küng and Ruland; see for example Küng (1993) and 
Ruland (2002). 
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to Hick’s unitary pluralism in that it depends on the ‘underlying notion that there is a 
unity to truth’, towards which individual religions, possessing only a part, may be 
seen to be working incessantly (Morris, 2013, 98). With special regard to 
soteriological questions, Heim therefore criticizes that classical pluralists including 
Panikkar cannot affirm a plurality of different approaches to salvation, homogenizing 
instead various religious beliefs and practices into a unified whole (Heim, 1995, 129-
131). Heim and Placher, in contrast, redefine pluralistic notions of salvation insofar as 
they do not see them as ‘partial perspectives on a single truth’, but ‘as a way of 
speaking about multiple realities, multiple truths and multiple ends’ that need not be 
reduced to a common core (Morris, 2013, 99). 
 
Another way of distinguishing between pluralist theories is therefore to identify 
reductive and non-reductive versions (Legenhausen, 2006, 2009; Barnes in Hinnells, 
2010). Here, the purpose of categorization is to distinguish between pluralist views 
that reduce differences to some common denominator for the sake of creating a unity 
among different religions (Hick, Knitter, Panikkar) and those that attempt to recognize 
the significance of difference within interfaith relations. Scholars who have objected 
to the reductiveness of classical pluralisms, thereby implicitly calling for a non-
reductive approach, are MacIntyre (1985), MacGrane (1989), Tracy (1994), Byrne 
(1995), and Sacks (2003). Given that most of these arguments are written in 
response to Hick’s pluralist hypothesis, it is this type of pluralism which will be 
considered more closely in the next section. 
 
2.3. Hick’s pluralism and its implications for interfaith dialogue 
In An Interpretation of Religion (1989), Hick proposes the metaphysical theory that 
there is a divine Reality above and beyond human comprehension, which is both 
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personal (as Western theism has it) and impersonal (as Eastern religions claim) 
(Hick, 1989, 252-255, 278-279). This reality makes itself known in different ways to 
all human beings according the latters’ particular cultural and historical modes of 
reception (Hick, 1989, 48). As different responses to the ineffable Real (ineffable 
because the Real is finally beyond all description) religions can thus be seen as 
alternative soteriological spaces founded – despite their differences in belief and 
practice – on a common core: the goal of guiding people to Reality-centredness. It is 
then reasonable to claim that all religions are true to some extent and false in other 
ways. D’Costa summarizes this idea as follows:  
 
‘[According to Hick,] religions are true in so much as they align believers correctly towards 
the Real producing an attitude of loving compassion towards one’s neighbour and social and 
natural environment thereby breaking down the egocentricism of the believer’s life […] They 
are false in so much as they claim ultimacy and finality regarding their conceptions of God 
[…] and in the way they sometimes give ontological uniqueness […] to the way in which this 
truth is mediated.’ (D’Costa, 1996, 227) 
 
Assuming partial truth in all religions, this pluralism could therefore be identified as a 
form of ontological pluralism (Akbari, 2009). Akbari argues that for ontological 
pluralists like Hick ‘the truth of all religions is a factual one’; whereas epistemic 
pluralists would support the somewhat weaker claim ‘that no religion is able to prove 
its own validity for other religions, and since we have no reason, we assume that all 
religions are true and authentic’ (Akbari, 2009, 103, my emphasis). Whether they are 
factually true and authentic, however, remains unanswerable from this perspective. 
Hick, by contrast, due to his ontological view, is able to support the thesis that all 
religions are authentic ways for man to relate to the same ineffable Real. 
 
Two argumentative devices are employed to establish this position. The first is the 
Kantian type distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal. According to 
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Kant, the noumenon is a posited object that is known (if at all) without the use of 
sense perception; whereas the phenomenon refers to anything that appears to, or is 
an intentional object of, the senses (Kant, 2005). Regarding the Real, Hick translates 
this as follows: There are two ways of speaking about the Real – first, as the Real an 
sich (in itself) which is beyond all description and hence, ineffable; and second, as 
the differing images of the Real within the religions which are but different 
phenomenal representations of the noumenal, in short: the real as humanly thought 
or experienced (Hick, 1989, 232-240). This enables Hick to claim that the Real is 
beyond everything, but related to human conceptions of the Transcendent such as 
God or Allah. The second device, employed by Hick to establish an egalitarian view 
of religions, is the distinction between mythic and factual truth. Here, it is argued that 
exclusivist truth claims such the Christian belief that God is disclosed in Jesus 
uniquely are not factually, but rather mythically true, and are therefore better 
understood as the believer’s personal way of relating to the figure of Christ than any 
metaphysical truth claim (Hick, 1989, 343-346; 353-355).  
 
This has important implications for interfaith dialogue: Relativizing religious claims to 
finality and truth in this way, Hick is able to shift the focus from potential conflicts in 
interreligious encounters to that which he sees as common to all religions: human 
striving for Reality-centredness, which opens the way to ‘loving compassion towards 
one’s neighbour’ (D’Costa, 1996, 227). On this basis, it is possible to hold that all 
religions, like members of one family, are equal partners in dialogue and 
collaboration (Hick, 1973 [1996], 146; 1989, 3-5). Therefore, for constructive interfaith 
dialogue to take place, one might conclude, participants in dialogue must simply 
concentrate on that which unites rather than separates them in their diversity, by 
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ignoring the particularities of their religious beliefs and focusing on potential 
commonalities instead. 
 
2.4. Common objections against Hick’s pluralist hypothesis 
Criticism of this view of interreligious relations comes from various academic fields. 
Philosophers of religion, assessing the extent to which pluralism can really be made 
normative, argue for example that it is implausible to make different expressions of 
the Absolute, let alone complete religious languages, equivalent (Cottingham, 2005; 
D’Costa, 1996; Loughlin, 1990, Rowe, 1999; Ward, 1990). To show that one cannot 
make two unknown variables (such as different concepts of the Absolute) identical, 
Ward claims: ‘it is rather like saying, “I do not know what X is; and I do not know what 
Y is; therefore X must be the same as Y”’ (Ward, 1990, 5). Others are concerned with 
ethical questions about the exercise of power that arise from pluralist worldviews. 
Asad, for example, rejects the underlying assumption of Western religious pluralism 
that there is nothing wrong about the pluralist’s desire ‘to mould others in one’s own 
image’ (Asad, 1993, 12). Furthermore, it is questioned whether the concept behind 
pluralism, postulating religions as identifiable entities, is at all valid. Lash drawing on 
the historical analyses of Harrison (1990) and Cantwell Smith (1978) objects that the 
models used by Western pluralists to describe non-Christian religions have their 
origin in the rationalist deism of Western Enlightenment and are therefore hardly 
applicable to other traditions (Lash, 1996). Similarly, Milbank argues that pluralism 
lacks a critical sense of itself as it ignores the possibility that its underlying ethical 
values are a ‘product of Anglo-American empiricist rationality’, which are simply 
imposed onto other cultures (Milbank, 1990, 175). And Masuzawa even goes as far 
as to claim that the whole discourse of world religions, especially in the 
phenomenology of religion with its constant focus on the irreducible uniqueness of 
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individual religious experience, is a hidden means to preserve European/Christian 
universalism, including traditional claims of intellectual superiority (Masuzawa, 2005). 
From this perspective, the pluralist’s concern to provide an egalitarian account of 
religion by focusing on commonalities between religions results, whether intentionally 
or not, in ongoing suppression of that which is perceived as religiously different from 
Western Christianity. 
 
2.5. The problem of difference 
This leads us to the main focus of this thesis: the problem of difference within 
interreligious relations. One of the first scholars who criticized the reductiveness of 
unitary theories of pluralism was MacIntyre in After Virtue (1985). The most serious 
problem involved in pluralism, as he sees it, is that this theory (although having 
transformed the Christian salvation problematic from the question of if people from 
other faiths can be saved to reflections on how they might be, e.g. despite or through 
their non-Christian beliefs) still focuses too much on the salvation of the other while 
ignoring completely the theological significance of otherness6 (MacIntyre, 1985, 205). 
Thus, one might claim that Hick’s pluralism, by creating an artificial unity among 
religions that consciously ignores differences in belief and practice, cannot 
encourage genuine dialogue as it fails to take otherness seriously in the first place. 
Similarly, MacGrane argues that religious pluralism opens the door to cultural 
relativism thereby trivializing encounters with people from other faith communities, 
which – much in contrast to its self-proclaimed aim – inevitably reaffirms ‘the 
Eurocentric idea of the progress of knowledge’ (MacGrane, 1989, 129).  
 
                                                            
6  Similar points  regarding  the  theological  significance of otherness  are made by  Tracy  (1994)  and 
Dupuis (1997). 
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To avoid the dangers of Eurocentricism, especially in the 21st century post- 9/11, 
(without doubt, an explosive ingredient in the potential ‘clash of civilizations’ predicted 
by Huntington), Sacks therefore calls on the religious leaders of the three great 
monotheistic faiths, Judaism, Christianity and Islam, to help create a new ‘religious 
paradigm’ that ‘values our shared humanity as the image of God […] But also values 
our differences’ (Sacks, 2003; Sacks, 2009, 41). According to Sacks, this new 
religious idea – the recognition of ‘the dignity of difference’ – is a promising 
alternative to both universalism and tribalism, which he sees as the two main existing 
human responses to the challenge of difference leading inevitably, however, to 
conflict between cultures and religions: 
 
‘Today we are inclined to see resurgent tribalism as the great danger of our 
fragmenting world. It is, but it is not the only danger. The paradox is that the very 
thing we take to be the antithesis of tribalism – universalism – can also be deeply 
threatening […] A global culture is a universal culture, and universal cultures, though 
they have brought about great good, have also done immense harm. They see as the 
basis of our humanity the fact that we are ultimately the same […] But if our 
commonalities are all that ultimately matter, then our differences are distractions to be 
overcome [by violence, if necessary]’ (Sacks. 2003, 47): 
 
Acknowledging the dignity of difference, by contrast, may open our hearts and minds 
to the enriching insights of other religions, which are revealed in both their universal 
messages and in the particular, thereby teaching us to respect other traditions for 
what they really are - ‘just as loving parents love all their children not for what makes 
them the same but for what makes each of them unique’ (Sacks, 2009, 41). Hence, it 
is arguable that reductive pluralism with its focus on universal spiritual values or 
human goals is, by its very nature, a hindrance rather than a help in furthering 
genuine understanding between different faiths. 
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As Legenhausen suggests, however, the fate of pluralism as a theoretical basis for 
constructive interfaith dialogue is not necessarily sealed. To solve the problem of 
difference, he claims, it is possible to propose a non-reductive version of it, capable 
of recognizing the dignity of difference called for by Sacks. In ‘A Muslim’s Proposal: 
Non-Reductive Religious Pluralism’ (2006), Legenhausen introduces the following 
classification: While reductive pluralists ‘attempt to identify a common element among 
different religions on the basis of which the religions are successful in some specified 
way’, non-reductive pluralists would claim that ‘God guides whomever He will, not 
only by virtue of features common to several religions, but by their unique divine 
qualities, as well’ (Legenhausen, 2006, 47).  This ‘ideal approach’ to interfaith 
relations, inherent in Islamic theology, Legenhausen argues, ‘recognize[s] and 
allow[s] for ultimately irreconcilable differences in practice as well as theory, while at 
the same time providing motivation for tolerance’, especially between Muslims and 
Christians (Legenhausen, 2006, 64). This is achieved by pointing to the principle of 
the general limitlessness of God’s grace, shared by both Shi’a Islam and Catholic 
Christianity. Thus, it is argued that, according to an Islamic non-reductive pluralism, 
‘correct faith is required but not necessary for salvation: It is required in the sense 
that it is made obligatory by the command of God’ – here: the believer’s recognition 
of Islam as the “Seal of Prophethood” – but not necessary ‘in the sense that it is 
possible for a person to be saved by the grace of God even though this obligation is 
not fulfilled’ (Legenhausen, no date [a]). From this position, religious differences are 
no longer culturally conditioned human constructions (as Hick’s pluralism implies); 
instead, religious diversity may be seen as divinely ordained and hence, valuable in 
its own right. It is on the basis of this theory, Legenhausen proclaims, that a 
                                                            
7 The numbers used  in reference to Legenhausen  (2006) are paragraph numbers  inserted by Legenhausen  in 
this online article in lieu of page numbers. 
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permanent solution to the problem of difference within interfaith relations can be 
found. 
 
2.6. Emerging issues and the need for further research 
As indicated in chapter 1, however, it is as yet unclear whether this particular 
proposal of a non-reductive version of religious pluralism can really be seen as a new 
theoretical framework for interfaith dialogue, and hence as an improvement of earlier 
approaches such as exclusivism, inclusivism and reductive pluralisms. As we have 
seen, Barnes identifies a possible link between Legenhausen’s position and Christian 
inclusivism, for example. Yet, the problem with this, as Legenhausen himself 
emphasizes, is that inclusivism maintains, to some extent at least, exclusivist claims 
of spiritual superiority, simply because the religion at hand – here Christianity – ‘is 
taken to have an advantage over others with regard to the truth of its creed’ or the 
effectiveness of its salvific powers (Legenhausen, 2006, 37). Yet, upholding the 
preeminence of Islam as the Seal of the Prophets (that is the only legitimate religion 
ordained by Allah for this era) is tantamount to saying that those who are following 
religions other than Islam today are practically ‘making a mistake’, albeit one which 
may be permissible if God wills (Legenhausen, 2006, 111). Using this version of 
pluralism as a theoretical basis for Muslim-Christian dialogue, it is evident then, 
would not lead to a truly egalitarian view of religions and their adherents, but rather to 
an attitude towards people of other faiths at constant risk of slipping back into the 
arrogance of inclusivist thinking. One might therefore conclude that even if this theory 
solved the problem of difference successfully – a point not yet proved – it would 
certainly do so at a great cost: Differences in belief and practice between Muslims 
and Christians, although recognized and allowed for from this position, are ultimately 
explained by reference to the false choices Christians have made vis à vis their 
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religion. Evaluating Legenhausen’s non-reductive pluralism as an approach capable 
of ‘tak[ing] the truths and values of different faith communities with the utmost 
seriousness’, as Barnes’s analysis suggests, would then be quite inaccurate (Barnes 
in Hinnells, 2010, 438). 
 
To summarize: This literature review revealed that issues of difference within 
interreligious relations are of utmost importance when trying to provide a theoretical 
framework for constructive interfaith dialogue today. Replying to the weaknesses 
identified in Hick’s pluralist hypothesis, numerous scholars have stressed the need 
for a theory of interreligious relations that is able to tolerate differences in belief and 
practice, but also religious and cultural identity, within dialogue situations (MacIntyre, 
MacGrane, Sacks). Legenhausen’s non-reductive pluralism presents itself as the 
perfect solution to the problem of difference and is even promoted, albeit implicitly, in 
the Routledge Companion to the Study of Religion (2010) as a promising ‘way 
forward’ for proponents of egalitarian concepts of interreligious relations (Barnes in 
Hinnells, 2010, 438). As the initial textual analysis has shown, however, it is hard to 
tell whether this position really departs from inclusivist interpretations of religion, 
upholding claims of spiritual superiority on the part of one religion. This raises the 
question of whether the significance of difference within interfaith relations is truly 
appreciated by it. To arrive at a deeper understanding of these issues, it is necessary 
to investigate both the problem of difference involved in reductive pluralism and 
Legenhausen’s non-reductive corrective to it more closely. The next chapter will start 
with the former task. 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
Religious pluralism and the problem of difference within 
interreligious relations 
 
3.1. Hick’s pluralism: A unifying or divisive force in interreligious relations? 
Before considering why recognizing differences is so important in the context of 
interfaith dialogue today, we need to investigate more thoroughly the connection 
between Hick’s unitary pluralism and issues of similarity and difference within 
interreligious relations. For this purpose, it is helpful to consider more closely the 
Kantian distinction between the noumenon and the phenomenon employed by Hick 
as a means to establish his egalitarian view of religions. Here follows a short 
summary of what was argued in chapter 2: Like Kant, who distinguishes between 
reality as it is in itself (the noumenon) and reality as perceived by a subject (the 
phenomenon), Hick differentiates between the Real an sich (Ultimate Reality) and the 
Real as variously understood by different religions (Hick, 1989, 236-240). He does so 
to argue for the pluralist hypothesis that all religions in the world, while certainly being 
the product of collective human attempts to know the noumenon, only manage to 
construct partially adequate understandings of the Real an sich in their own cultural 
terms (Hick, 1989, 236-240). In other words, even though the Real in itself is 
presupposed in religious experience according to Hick, what people actually 
experience when engaging in their particular religious practices, for example, is only 
one form or another of the phenomenal Real – the Real as humanly thought or 
experienced. As we have seen, employing this argumentative device enables Hick to 
claim that all religions, despite their differences in belief and practice, are equally 
valid and authentic human responses to the one ineffable Real. Thus, Hick shifts the 
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focus from potential conflicts in interreligious encounters, originating for instance from 
adherence to exclusivist truth claims, to that which unites different religions in their 
diversity. 
 
As chapter 2 revealed, however, this unifying tendency inherent in Hick’s focus on a 
common spiritual core can also be seen as a divisive force as it ignores not only the 
social and political, but also the theological significance of difference within 
interreligious relations. To look deeper into the subject matter now, let us examine 
the reason why this is the case. Hick’s ignoring of issues of difference, it is arguable, 
is a direct consequence of a key premise involved in his argument: the idea of ‘the 
religious ambiguity of the universe’ (Hick, 1989, 75-78): Needing to explain how 
people of intelligence may justifiably subscribe to different religious ideologies – 
without having to give up the presupposition of the general rationality of religious 
belief8 – Hick is obliged to draw the somewhat counter-intuitive conclusion that the 
universe is ‘religiously ambiguous’ (Hick, 1989, 77, 210). As Dastmalchian objects, 
however, this theory is itself quite ambiguous as it fails to specify which type of 
religious ambiguity (temporary or permanent) is implied in it (Dastmalchian, 2009, 
81). Here are Dastmalchian’s definitions of these two types:  
 
‘The experiencable universe is temporarily religiously ambiguous if, at a given time, 
and despite the best of human efforts, one religious ideology cannot be distinguished 
from others on truth-conducive grounds, without there being reason to suggest that 
this stalemate must necessarily be the case for all time […] The experiencable 
universe is permanently religiously ambiguous if it is inescapably the case in this life 
that one religious ideology can never be distinguished from all other religious 
ideologies on truth-conducive evidential grounds (Dastmalchian, 2009, 81-82). 
 
                                                            
8 The theory of the rationality of belief  is established by Hick by arguing that the mere fact that people have 
religious experiences provides them with a justification for adopting religious beliefs (Hick, 1989, 210). 
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Yet, to establish a truly egalitarian view of religions, Dastmalchian concludes, it does 
not make sense for Hick to refer to temporary religious ambiguity here because ‘if the 
experiencable universe is [only] temporarily religiously ambiguous, a religious 
epistemic exclusivist would still have confidence in the truth of his own religious 
beliefs’, in which case other religions might be approached with suspicion or even 
hostility (Dastmalchian, 2009, 87). What Hick must therefore have in mind is that the 
universe we experience is permanently religiously ambiguous. Exclusivist 
approaches to interreligious relations would then be (by their very nature) 
unreasonable, simply because exclusivists could no longer expect their own religious 
beliefs to be ever shown to be true.  
 
Unfortunately, the same line of argument leads into serious problems concealing the 
role and significance of issues of difference within interfaith relations. If the universe 
as we know it is permanently religiously ambiguous, the only absolute in religious 
matters that remains for now and forever is the Real an sich. The Real, however, can 
never be known completely by any individual or religious tradition because it is 
ultimately beyond human (phenomenal) comprehension. Consequently, only the 
noumenal Real holds absoluteness, while all other religious truths and practices are 
only relative to the respective religious traditions and to people’s experiences within 
those traditions (Stenger, 2011, 171). Hick’s pluralism, it is evident then, faces the 
challenge of cultural and religious relativity. 
 
3.2.  Hick’s pluralist hypothesis and the charge of cultural and religious and 
relativism 
Van der Ven summarizes the charge of relativism from an emic Christian perspective: 
According to the pluralist hypothesis, ‘Christianity and the other religions are all just 
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vehicles of knowledge about […] God, contextually confined as they are both 
temporally and spatially’ (Van der Ven, 2006, 431). The cultural relativism involved in 
this view therefore leads, inevitably, ‘to religious relativism, which is incompatible with 
Christianity’s claim, not merely to universality but also to uniqueness and 
absoluteness’ (Van der Ven, 2006, 431). As the Vatican document Dominus Jesus 
(2000) specifies, he argues, Christianity has, from an orthodox viewpoint, not only ‘a 
universal message for all peoples in all ages; that message also contains the unique 
truth […] and this truth is also absolute, not to be experienced by any other religion’ 
(Van der Ven, 2006, 431). This reveals that Hick’s pluralism, relativizing claims to 
religious truth and uniqueness by placing them in the phenomenal realm alone, 
cannot fully appreciate the significance of insiders’ perspectives on their own as well 
as other religions. Van der Ven therefore suggests that Race’s tripartite model of 
exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism is a misleading method of categorization. 
While both exclusivist and inclusivist models approach issues of interfaith relations 
from an emic (mostly, Christian) ‘participant perspective’, on the basis of which 
participants in dialogue may ‘identify with their own tradition and approach other 
religions from that same perspective’; pluralism attempts to look at religions from an 
exclusive ‘observer perspective’ (Van der Ven, 2006, 431). Thus, it tries to examine 
all religions (including the one that the examiner may identify with) from an outsider 
perspective, describing as objectively as possible how individuals or groups interpret 
the noumenal Real without paying too much attention to the insiders’ phenomenal 
realm of experience. It is this realm of experience, however, which ultimately reveals 
the importance of differences in belief, doctrine and practice felt by participants in 
dialogue when faced with other worldviews. A model for interfaith relations that does 
not take seriously such insider perspectives in the first place, one might therefore 
conclude, is not a satisfactory basis for interfaith dialogue.  
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This suggests that Hick’s pluralism, although designed as an appeal for tolerance, 
actually misses the point. As Springsted argues ‘the real problem of interreligious 
dialogue is not, as Hick sees it, in removing those beliefs and values that appear to 
hinder dialogue because of their uniqueness, but in engaging in dialogue given those 
beliefs and values’ (Springsted, 1992, 25-26). Drawing on Weil’s The Need for Roots 
(1971), Springsted therefore claims that a truly constructive approach always needs 
to ‘consider the broader cultural and historical context of the person entering into 
dialogue, including his values’ and religious convictions (Springsted, 1992, 34). The 
Christian doctrine of incarnation, for example, – albeit certainly a delicate issue in 
Muslim-Christian relations – does then not have to be viewed as ‘a narrow doctrinal 
and intellectual claim to exclusivity’ anymore but rather in terms of ‘its function in 
forming the character of the person who holds it’ (Springsted, 1992, 34). It is this 
individual character, rooted in particular values and convictions, Weil argues, that 
ultimately determines the fate of any dialogue situation. 
 
Yet, one might object to the charge of relativism, as Stenger does, that Hick is by no 
means a pure relativist of religions. Even though ‘for Hick the Real in itself grounds 
religious experiences of varying kinds’, she claims, there can be ‘only one ultimate, 
not a plurality of ultimates’ (Stenger, 2011, 170). This one Real in itself, she therefore 
insists, is the one absolute in Hick’s hypothesis, which effectively ‘prevent[s] a pure 
relativism’ (Stenger, 2011, 170). This objection, however, is not convincing because 
the only contribution it makes to the debate on cultural relativity is that it keeps Hick 
from being a pure relativist about the nature of Transcendence; the charges of 
cultural and religious relativism in the context of practical religious differences, 
29 
 
however, are not refuted by it. The cultural relativity resulting from Hick’s theory can 
therefore be seen as an unsolved problem in the pluralist agenda. 
 
3.3.  Ethical pluralisms and the charge of moral universalism 
Relativism, however, is not the only problem involved in pluralist theories that might 
lead to ignoring issues of difference within interreligious relations. Ethical pluralists 
such as Knitter, Küng or Ruland, for example, could be accused of moral 
universalism. Let us consider Ruland as the most recent example. In Conscience 
Across Borders (2002), Ruland promotes his vision of a ‘global God-centered ethics’ 
based on Küng’s ‘Global Ethics’ written in 1993 for the Second Parliament of the 
World’s Religions in Chicago (Ruland, 2002). Both works explore what could be 
called “the ways of religious wisdom”, bringing the resources of interfaith dialogue to 
bear on such varied issues as human rights, global responsibility, social justice and 
environmental protection. Thus, with regard to the dangers of ecological degradation 
in a globalized world, for example, Ruland appeals for a religiously comparative, 
‘God-centered ecology’, a concept of interreligious collaboration which rests on the 
premise that the God invoked in the recesses of human conscience is not the 
exclusive property of Christians because other religions bear witness to similar moral 
ideals (here: to preserve God’s creation) (Ruland, 2002, 69-70). This global ‘ethics of 
virtue, character and story’, rooted in both the narratives and universal spiritual 
insights of the world religions, Ruland proclaims, has the potential of complementing 
the ‘minimal ethics of international law’ such as the UN’s Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) in at least two important ways: First, at a theoretical level, it is 
able to ‘internalize [secular] human rights ideals’ on spiritual grounds; and second, at 
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a practical level, it invites religious leaders and laypeople from different religions to 
work together for the realization of shared human goals9 (Ruland, 2002, 145). 
 
Yet, the problem with this view is that it ignores potential cultural differences in moral 
experience by universalizing, unconsciously, the moral standards of Western 
liberalism. The human rights debate illustrates this: Generally speaking, the concept 
of human rights – clearly the basis for Knitter’s, Küng’s and Ruland’s global ethics 
projects – involves the fundamental belief that all human beings, regardless of race, 
sex, class or religion, possess a certain range of inalienable rights to which they are 
inherently entitled for the mere reason of being human. Modern human rights 
conceptions in particular, however, might be seen as culture-specific in that they go 
back to the foundation of the UN in the aftermath of WWII. One of the UN’s main 
objectives is to ‘achieve international cooperation […] in promoting and encouraging 
respect for human rights’ (The United Nations). The UDHR, adopted by the UN 
General Assembly in 1948, can then be viewed as a conceptual basis for the 
realization of this goal. In its preamble, this document appeals for the universal 
recognition of human dignity as the ‘foundation of freedom, peace and justice in the 
world’ (UDHR). The main body determines different types of rights and freedoms: 
rights of the individual in civil society; spiritual, public and political freedoms; and 
social, economic and cultural rights. To stress the absolute universality of these 
rights, the General Assembly calls them a ‘common standard of achievement for all 
peoples and all nations’ (UDHR).  
 
                                                            
9 Another ethical pluralist vision of global responsibility, based on the common human experience of suffering, 
can be found in Knitter (1995), (1996) and (1998). Similar views are expressed by Gyger in D’Arcy May (1998). 
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However, this claim of universality is contested. Associated with the Western system 
of democracy, human rights are sometimes perceived by outsiders of the tradition as 
culture-specific inventions imposed onto other cultures in a paternalistic way. 
Especially in Muslim majority societies, the validity of the concept is disputed10. It 
should be noted, though, that various factors complicate the relationship between 
human rights and Islam. These are the history of conflict between Europe and the 
Middle East from the crusades to colonialism, the continuing global power of the 
West, especially in the form of American capitalism; and the existence of sharia law 
as an alternative to Western law models (Herbert, 2001, 66-68). It is also worth 
noting that sharia and human rights laws differ in one fundamental aspect: Whereas 
sharia emphasizes a collective obedience to divine law, human rights laws stress 
individual freedom, which (from an etic perspective) could be interpreted as a sign for 
the loss of solidarity in Western societies, brought about by the dehumanizing effects 
of Western capitalism. From this viewpoint, there seems to be a clash of moral values 
between Western human rights protecting individual freedom of thought, for example, 
and sharia which ‘in its official interpretation based on ta’a [obedience] condemns it’ 
(Mernissi in Herbert, 2001, 70). Global ethics projects such as those undertaken by 
Knitter, Küng and Ruland, clearly rooted in the ideals of Western liberalism, might 
then be accused of a moral universalism which ignores the possibility that ethical 
values might be relative to the culture from which they derive. 
 
This view – commonly referred to as “ethical relativism” – can also be found in 
Masuzawa’s The Inventions of World Religions (2005). According to her, the whole 
concept of world religions stems from the illegitimate European universalization of the 
                                                            
10 Halliday refers to this Muslim view as ‘particularist’ in that it denies the relevance of human rights discourse 
in non‐Western cultural settings (Halliday, 1995, 137). 
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concept of religion. Using Troeltsch’s phenomenological concept of ‘religion itself, as 
a unique sphere of life’ as an example, Masuzawa claims: 
 
‘[O]ur default position on the subject matter of religions is saturated by the world 
religions discourse, which thrives and survives precisely on this easy slippage from 
the particular (Euro-Christianity) to the general (religion as such). For, even without a 
thorough historical analysis, it seems obvious enough that the discourse of world 
religions takes for granted the idea of religions […] as “a unique sphere of life”, and 
that it presumes that this sphere is prevalent throughout the world and its history’ 
(Masuzawa, 2005, 313). 
 
Such appeals for the potential cultural particularity of both moral standards and 
insider perspectives on the spiritual dimensions of non-Western societies (although 
the latter might be a more pressing issue in the context of Asian polytheistic and 
nontheistic spiritualties than in the context of Islamic monotheism), might be 
particularly important in Muslim minority contexts in the West, where issues of 
cultural identity play a special role. Here, one might argue, recognizing differences 
such as varying Muslim and Christian understandings of political authority, civil 
responsibility and human rights could serve to protect different senses of cultural and 
religious identity, improving perhaps mutual knowledge in multi-faith contexts.  
 
This, however, should not imply that ethical relativists are right to assume that moral 
values, including those found in the UDHR, are never universal or that it is impossible 
to identify a common moral denominator within various religions. Specifically, the 
Second Parliament’s promotion of the Golden Rule (‘we must treat others as we wish 
others to treat us’), found in one form or another in the scriptures of all the world 
religions, is a promising start for an interreligious ethical consensus (The Parliament 
of the World Religions). What this analysis suggests, however, especially regarding 
issues of difference, is that ethical pluralisms – like Hick’s unitary pluralism –, while 
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certainly possessing the potential of encouraging global interreligious collaboration, 
may not be a recommendable theoretical basis for interfaith dialogue, as they too are 
unable to truly appreciate differences in religious belief, moral standards and cultural 
identity. A better basis, as I shall argue in chapter 5, might therefore be found in 
(religiously non-specific) models of witnessing, based for example on a minimal virtue 
ethics centering on the notions of “humility”, “hospitality” and “friendship”. 
 
3.4.  The dignity of difference within interreligious relations 
As indicated in chapter 2, The Dignity of Difference (2003), written by Sacks (Chief 
Rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregations of the Commonwealth) can be seen as 
an influential contribution to the field of “difference-respecting” theories of 
interreligious relations. In this section, I shall use Sacks’s argument for the 
introduction of a new religious paradigm – the global recognition of the dignity of 
difference – as an important objection to the pluralist theories examined above. This 
argument rests on two premises: First, ‘the economics and politics of globalization 
have an inescapable moral dimension’ whose aim it must be ‘to enhance, not 
compromise, human dignity’ (Sacks, 2003, 3-4). And second, great responsibility to 
secure human dignity ‘lies within the world’s religious communities’, which against all 
expectation (that is much in contrast to what secularization theory predicted), have 
emerged in the twenty-first century ‘as key forces in a global age’ (Sacks, 2003, 4). 
Yet, neither tribalism nor universalism are adequate responses to the challenge of 
difference in this multi-faith world: Resurgent tribalism, e.g. in Muslim majority 
countries such as Pakistan or Iraq, it is evident, is inadequate because (as Sacks 
summarizes) ‘a tribal world is agonistic: a place of conflict where the strongest wins 
and honour and glory lie in fighting, even dying, in a noble cause’ (Sacks, 2003, 47). 
Universalism, however, as we have seen, may not always be a better solution 
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because it ignores the uniqueness of individual religions, by assuming that in times of 
conflict (between different cultures, traditions, nations, or social groups) all that 
ultimately matters are our commonalities (Sacks, 2003, 47).  
 
According to Sacks, this view which has been ‘at the heart of Western civilization’ for 
at least two millennia is profoundly mistaken (Sacks, 2003, 48). He calls it ‘Plato’s 
ghost’, implying that the ghost of universalism, haunting Western thought, must finally 
be exorcized (Sacks, 2003, 48). Using Plato’s parable of the cave as an illustration, 
Sacks explains that for Plato the true essence of things is not matter (e.g. a particular 
tree) but form or ideas (the concept of Treeness), that is not the concrete 
embodiment of things in the world of senses but their conceptual essence. Thus, he 
argues, in Plato’s ‘world of ideas, difference is resolved into sameness’ and 
‘[p]articulars give way to universals’ (Sacks, 2003, 49). What is problematic about this 
theory today is that it is frequently applied not just to physical objects like trees, but 
also to matters of truth. The true essence of things, Sacks claims, is where ‘trees 
become Treeness; where men become Man and apparent truths coalesce into Truth’ 
(Sacks, 2003, 49). In other words, truth (the essence of things) according to Western 
philosophy, are usually viewed as universal, thus building potential bases for human 
collaboration; whereas particularity tends to be seen as a classical ‘source of conflict, 
prejudice, error and war’ (Sacks, 2003, 49). When put to the practical test, however, 
universalism – especially as a political system – does not often lead to peace and 
harmony because it grants rights to outsiders only if they convert, conform, 
assimilate, and thus, cease to be outsiders (Sacks, 2003, 61). Empirical evidence for 
this can be found in the fact that Jews suffered under all five universalist cultures in 
the history of the West, the Alexandrian Empire, ancient Rome, medieval Christianity 
and Islam, and the Enlightenment, even though three of them (Greece, Rome and 
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the Enlightenment) ‘prided themselves on their tolerance’ (Sacks, 2003, 61). Sacks 
therefore concludes that it is time for us to exorcize the ghost of universalism, so 
influential in Western thought, recognizing, instead, the enriching  power of 
‘difference as a source of value and society’ (Sacks, 2003, 14).  
 
The story of Abraham from which the three monotheisms, Judaism, Christianity and 
Islam, descend may provide a solid basis for this new religious paradigm. To counter 
the dualism of tribalism and universalism, Sacks argues, this story offers a third 
option, recognizing the dignity of difference in that it reverses the Platonic worldview. 
Instead of turning particulars into universals, Sacks explains, this story begins with 
universal humanity (in the Genesis account of creation) and only ‘then proceeds to 
the particular: one man, Abraham’, thereby suggesting that universalism is the ‘first, 
not the last phase in the growth of the moral imagination’ (Sacks, 2003, 51). The 
same anti-universalist tendency is revealed later on in the story when God, having 
made his covenant with all mankind (understood here as the first universal moral 
code) decides again to turn to one particular people (the Israelites), commanding it to 
be different and thus ‘teaching humanity to make space for difference’ (Sacks, 2003, 
51, 53). At a time of global interconnectedness like ours, in which cultural and 
religious diversity has become part of the texture of everyday life (at work, in our 
families, on TV), it is therefore reasonable to claim that the most pressing task for any 
social order is to make space for otherness as well. Interfaith dialogue might then no 
longer have to be seen as a practice focusing primarily on similarities between 
religions (as unitary and ethical pluralisms seem to suggest), but rather as the art of 
embracing and perhaps even reconciling difference11. 
                                                            
11  It might be objected that Sacks’s view of the world religions as global forces, responsible to secure human 
dignity,  is  itself  somewhat  universalistic  in  that  it  implies  the  existence  of  shared  ethical  standards within 
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3.5.  Scriptural Reasoning as a difference-respecting practice 
One form of interreligious exchange identifiable as such a difference-respecting 
practice is Scriptural Reasoning. Ford offers the following description: Scriptural 
Reasoning is a type of interdisciplinary, interfaith scriptural reading (mainly taking 
place between Jews, Christians and Muslims), which had its origin in the textual 
reasoning of the mid-twentieth century, conducted among Jewish text scholars (of 
Tanakh and Talmud), on the one hand, and Western philosophers on the other (Ford, 
2006, 347). Unhappy about the lack of fruitful engagement between the two 
disciplines, these scholars (Cohen, Rosenzweig, Buber, Levinas), trained in both 
traditional Jewish interpretation and Western academic methods began to meet to 
study Jewish scriptures in dialogue with Western philosophy, thus bringing together 
classical Jewish exegesis and the practices of modern philosophical/theological 
reasoning (Ford, 2006, 347). Their main aim was to examine the role that post-Shoah 
Judaism might play in this world by interrogating both the Western modernity within 
which the Holocaust had been possible and also ‘the resources – premodern, 
modern and postmodern – for responding to it within Judaism’ (Ford, 2006, 347). 
They concluded that two things were particularly required from post-Shoah Judaism 
at that time: first, a new appropriation of its scriptures and traditions of interpretation; 
and second, a deeper engagement with people from other religions, especially 
Christians and Muslims. (Ford, 2006, 347). Later, in the 1990s, these inner-Jewish 
discussions, together with similar debates among Christian proponents of 
‘postcritical, “postliberal” hermeneutics’ (such as Frei and Lindbeck) led to the 
development of what is known as “Abrahamic interfaith scripture study” – a practice 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
different cultures and religions. To avoid the charge of moral universalism, this thesis therefore proposes  (in 
chapter 5) the idea of a “minimal ethical pluralism” based on a small set of virtues that are culturally unspecific. 
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conducted among the members of the three Abrahamic monotheisms. Today, such 
interfaith groups meet, for example, to read and discuss passages from their 
respective sacred texts thereby exploring the ways in which textual study can help 
them to understand and respond to pressing contemporary issues ranging from 
globalization and plurality to the Middle East conflict and Islamist terrorism. 
 
The reason why Scriptural Reasoning might count as a difference-respecting practice 
is that it rests on the idea of ‘Abrahamic collegiality’, a principle aimed at interreligious 
friendship, not consensus (Ford, 2006, 348). Just like friends who do not necessarily 
have to agree upon everything in order to be friends, it is argued that members of 
different religions need not always arrive at a consensus on critical theological issues 
in order to engage with each other in mutual trust and friendship. An important notion 
used to describe the social dynamics of this encounter is that of a ‘three-way mutual 
hospitality’ on the basis of which ‘each [religion] is host to the others and guest to the 
others’, just as ‘each welcomes the other two to their “home” scripture and its 
traditions of interpretation’ (Ford, 2006, 349). Although consensus may happen in an 
atmosphere of hospitality (Ford concludes), a ‘recognition of deep differences’ is also 
possible (Ford, 2006, 349).  
 
Difference-respecting practices like these are especially important in this global age 
of interconnectedness where much of human communication is controlled by the 
regulatory systems of modern information technologies such as the Internet, which 
have turned conversation into a virtual monologue. Askari argues that this cybernetic 
tendency criticized by philosophers writing as early as Camus or Buber (albeit still 
focusing on the forces of social, political and economic systems rather than 
technological advances then) has now developed an even stronger emphasis on 
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monologue that can only be overcome by a ‘dialogical revolution’ led by the world 
religions (Askari, 1992, 478-479). Christianity and Islam, he claims, are capable of 
setting a good example because of the special ‘dialogical relationship’ inherent in 
their scriptures. Specifically, the figure of Jesus, found in both the New Testament 
and the Qur’an, may provide room for Christian-Muslim encounter and might hence 
be regarded as a ‘common sign between Christianity and Islam’ (Askari, 1992, 481):  
 
‘In all such Qur’anic discourses [about the People of the Book], it is difficult to miss 
the deep feeling of Christianity and Islam being present to each other. One is aware 
of the other’s presence. One is aware of strong disagreements. One is aware of deep 
sharing. What else could signify this deep sharing more than the fact that Jesus is the 
common center between Christians and Muslims? He is the word, speech, meaning, 
and occasion of the dialogical relationship between them. He is the common “Sign”’ 
(Askari, 1992, 482). 
 
Yet, here too it is worth noting that focusing on commonalities like these need not 
lead to perfect consensus about the spiritual role, nature and significance of the 
figure of Christ among Muslims and Christians. A sign, Askari argues, is by no means 
a ‘technical truth’ exchanged neutrally between strangers (Askari, 1992, 485). Quite 
the contrary: ‘in spiritual matters, to know is to be in a new relationship with one who 
shares that knowledge. To know is to belong. Friendship is presupposed in common 
religious knowledge’ (Askari, 1992, 485). So, here too, the metaphor of friendship 
makes space for difference. The fact that Christian and Muslim attitudes to Jesus are 
not identical is explained by ‘the very ambiguity’ or ‘richness of the religious sign’ 
itself, giving rise to different interpretations of it, thereby not just allowing but also 
creating dissimilarities (Askari, 1992, 485). Christian-Muslim exchanges, based on 
the principles of hospitality and friendship, we may therefore conclude, are useful 
examples of how the dignity of difference promoted by Sacks can be effectively 
preserved in practice. However, to return to the main focus of this thesis – the search 
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for a difference-respecting theory of interreligious relations – the next chapter will 
consider the possibility of a non-reductive version of pluralism that might serve as a 
corrective to Hick’s hypothesis, thereby providing, perhaps, a solution to the problem 
of difference at a theoretical level, as well. 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
Legenhausen’s non-reductive corrective to Hick’s pluralist 
hypothesis: A sound solution to the problem of difference? 
 
 
4.1. Legenhausen’s proposal: Islamic non-reductive religious pluralism  
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, there is little hope that classical pluralisms 
can ever be counted among the difference-respecting theories of interreligious 
relations. The main reason for this, I have argued, is that these types of pluralism are 
inherently reductive in that they tend to create an artificial unity between the religions 
by reducing religious differences to the lowest common denominator such as a 
shared basic belief in the Transcendent or adherence to common moral ideals. 
According to Legenhausen, however, the fate of pluralism as a potential theoretical 
framework for interfaith dialogue may not be sealed since a non-reductive version of 
it could solve the problem of difference. Legenhausen is an American philosopher 
and Christian convert to Shi’a Islam who taught philosophy of religion and ethics at 
the Islamic Iranian Academy of Philosophy from 1990 to 1994 and now (2014) 
teaches Western philosophy and Christianity at the Imam Khomeini Education and 
Research Institute in Qom, Iran. He is an advocate of interreligious dialogue, 
concentrating specifically on Muslim-Christian relations. Having experienced both 
Christianity and Islam from an insider viewpoint, Legenhausen (one might suggest) is 
in fact in a good position to offer a model for Muslim-Christian dialogue that could 
bridge the gulf between the pure participant perspectives of inclusivist approaches for 
example, and the objective observer perspectives of pluralist conceptions of religion, 
criticized by Van der Ven as too neutral for authentic interfaith exchange.  
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Let us therefore take a closer look at what Legenhausen proposes: Reductive 
pluralist taxonomies like Hick’s pluralism, trying to typify religious experiences across 
religious boundaries, he argues, are inappropriate as they ‘ignore the importance and 
contribution of the concepts and categories provided by a specific religious tradition 
to the religious experience itself’ (Legenhausen, no date, [a]). In other words, Hick’s 
theory, due to its constant focus on the noumenon as the only absolute in religious 
matters, does not take seriously the phenomenal realm of experience of individuals 
and groups of believers. Another proof for the incapacity of Hick’s pluralism to make 
space for difference, Legenhausen states, can be found in the fact that the idea of 
divine revelation, so essential to the Abrahamic religions, is incompatible with it. 
Drawing on Alston’s analysis of Hick’s theory of the religious ambiguity of the 
universe, he writes: 
 
‘According to Judaism, Christianity and Islam, God truly reveals Himself to man. If He 
were to provide us with accounts of Himself that are couched in terms of one of the 
many ways in which He could appear to us, rather than in terms of what He is and 
does, revelations would be misleading at best and deceptive at worst’ (Legenhausen, 
no date, [a]) 
 
The problem with this way of thinking, as we have already seen, is that it implies that 
religious traditions, including the outward religious forms developed by them, are not 
the result of separate divine revelations and hence, willed by God for whatever 
reason12, but merely the product of different cultural constructions of the phenomenal 
Real. This substantial trivialization of the particular, it is obvious then, will hardly be 
capable of recognizing the dignity of difference so important to interfaith dialogue in a 
global age. Therefore, to cure religious pluralism of its reductiveness, Legenhausen 
                                                            
12 From a (Sufi) Muslim perspective, for example, one might find reasons for the presence of religious diversity 
in the metaphysical principle of self‐knowledge through divine self‐disclosure (Shah‐Kazemi, 2006, 115). 
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claims, it is necessary to provide a version of it that appreciates differences in belief, 
doctrine and practice as an integral part of religious experience and identity.  
 
As chapter 2 revealed, Legenhausen is convinced that Shi’a theology – in particular 
the principle of the general limitlessness of God’s grace, shared also by Roman 
Catholicism – provides all the resources needed to construct such a non-reductive, 
and hence difference-respecting, version of pluralism. This pluralism, he argues, may 
serve as a corrective to Hick’s hypothesis because it provides motivation for 
tolerance without having to reduce irreconcilable differences between Muslims and 
Christians (such as different understandings of the oneness of God; the incarnation; 
the nature and role of Jesus Christ, etc.) to a common core. This is achieved through 
the following change of perspective: Instead of arguing that ‘what is good about 
religions is what is common to a plurality of them’, non-reductive pluralists take the 
view that ‘each of a number of religions has unique features through which God may 
guide people, even if there is no common essence to all religions’ (Legenhausen, 
2006, 4). From this viewpoint, the particular beliefs and practices found in different 
traditions may then no longer have to be seen as obstacles in the way of an 
egalitarian interpretation of interreligious relations. On the contrary, what is unique to 
a variety of religions, according to this form of pluralism, is what gives them value in 
the first place (Legenhausen, 2009, 37).  
 
Traditional Islamic theology, Legenhausen argues, provides sufficient room for such 
a view of religions: According to the famous Hadith of Abu Dharr about the total 
number of prophets, the identities of all the prophets, acknowledged as rightful 
messengers of the divine revelation, are not known. Abu Dharr reports that the 
Prophet (Muhammad) told him there had been one hundred and twenty-four 
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thousand prophets before him, of whom three hundred and fifteen were messengers 
of Allah. Given that we cannot know which ones of the pre-Islamic prophets were 
rightful messengers and which ones were hypocrites, Legenhausen claims, we must 
‘admit our ignorance in this matter’ as ‘an expression of humility before the judgment 
of Allah’, thereby leaving open the question of ‘how God may guide the sincere, and 
what beliefs are the result of a sincere quest for the truth’ (Legenhausen, 2006, 115).  
 
Furthermore, he argues, to understand how to approach the problem of diversity 
within the context of Islam, it is important to distinguish from each other the two 
issues of correct faith and salvation as clearly as possible: 
 
‘According to Islam, the correct religion ordained by God is that revealed to the last of 
His chosen prophets, Muhammad; this and no other religion is required by Allah of all 
mankind. In this sense, Islam is exclusivist. However, at various times prior to His final 
revelation, God ordained other religions by means of His prophets. So, the reason 
why the religion brought to Moses is not acceptable today is not that what Moses 
taught was wrong or incompatible with the teachings brought to Muhammad, for they 
taught basically the same things, but because God has ordained the latter teachings 
for this era’ (Legenhausen, 2006, 73). 
 
 
 
Thus, it is arguable that there are two senses of Islam: general Islam, understood in 
its literal sense as the complete submission to God’s will, which includes all the 
divinely revealed religions; and specific Islam, which refers ‘to the final version of 
Islam (in the general sense) brought by Muhammad’ in the early seventh century CE 
(Legenhausen, 2006, 74). It is evident then that the previous teachings, followed by 
Jews and Christians for example, were not incorrect or insufficient to guide to 
salvation those for whom they were revealed (Legenhausen, 2006, 73, 96). Whether 
they still contain a soteriological quality, strong enough to guide non-Muslims to 
salvation now that specific Islam exists, however, is not for us to decide. Yet, what is 
certain at any stage in human history, Legenhausen concludes, is that it would be 
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highly arrogant to assume that God, whose grace is believed to be infinite, cannot or 
will not guide non-Muslims to salvation through their non-Muslim beliefs 
(Legenhausen, 2006, 114). 
 
At first glance – one might object – this theory is incompatible with the traditional 
Muslim belief of the Seal of Prophethood: the fundamental conviction that Islam, in its 
specific sense, is ordained by Allah as the only religion to be followed legitimately in 
this era. Legenhausen, however, does not see any contradiction here. Again the 
distinction between correct faith and salvation solves the dilemma: Even though 
correct faith (including the belief in Islam as the final revelation) is theoretically and 
practically required of all people living today, it may not be necessary for salvation, 
simply because we cannot exclude the possibility that a person is saved by the grace 
of God even though this strict obligation of faith is not fulfilled (Legenhausen, no date, 
[a]). Drawing on the philosophical insights of the great Sufi theoretician Arabi, 
Legenhausen clarifies that the mere ‘fact that God’s truth can find expression in 
different, even, apparently conflicting, religions, does not mean that people are free 
to choose whatever religion suits their fancy’ because there is no denying that ‘all 
previously revealed religions become invalid (balit) with the revelation of the Qur’an’; 
and even though they may contain partial truth, it is still ‘obligatory to follow the 
shari’ah of specific Islam’ today (Legenhausen, 2006, 96). Yet, for those who choose 
or have already adopted an illegitimate religion such as Judaism or Christianity, not 
knowing that they are making a mistake, one might claim (following Legenhausen’s 
argumentation), God’s grace will always provide a “backdoor” to salvation. 
 
This theory focusing on the mystery of the divine, Legenhausen suggests, is a much 
better approach to interreligious relations than the relativism of unitary pluralisms or 
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the syncretism of some modern spiritualties. Relativism is a barrier to meaningful 
interfaith discussion ‘because it deprives one from [sic] the ability to criticize others or 
to seriously consider criticism’; syncretism undermines dialogue ‘by condoning what 
is unacceptable by the mainstream of any of the traditions represented in dialogue’ – 
the uncritical mixture of elements from different religions without a centre, focal point 
or integrating principle, to use Samartha’s negative definition (Legenhausen, 2006, 
119; Samartha, 1990, 255). Islamic non-reductive pluralism, on the contrary, instead 
of ignoring conflicting truth claims, ‘can accept as granted that each person, rightly or 
wrongly, considers his own faith as the best […] while admitting that in other 
traditions there may be genuine religious and moral values to be appreciated’ as well 
(Legenhausen, 2006, 120). This theory, it therefore seems, manages to incorporate 
both insider perspectives, by letting participants maintain the absolute validity of their 
own religious commitments, and outsider perspectives, by creating an openness to 
listening and learning from the other, thereby recognizing the dignity of difference 
within interfaith relations at least to some extent. This might explain why Barnes 
considers this approach as a potential corrective to Hick’s pluralism. 
 
4.2. Objection 1: Legenhausen’s theory is not new – The link to Christian 
inclusivism 
Yet, Legenhausen’s attempt at solving the problem of difference involved in reductive 
pluralism is less successful than it appears. One objection against this theory is, for 
example, that it is ultimately based on inclusivist thinking – the very concept of 
interreligious relations that religious pluralism seeks to refute. Let us therefore 
examine this second category in Race’s threefold typology, considered briefly in 
chapter 1, a little more closely. As we have seen, inclusivism in the context of 
Christian soteriology is the view that other religions, albeit possessing salvific 
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significance, only lead to salvation by virtue of the hidden work of Christ in them. 
Here D’Costa distinguishes between the following two types: structural and 
restrictivist inclusivisms (D’Costa, 2009, 19-25). What both views have in common, 
he argues, is that they see Christ’s incarnation as absolutely necessary for the 
salvation of Christians and non-Christians alike – in contrast to religious pluralism, for 
which belief in Christ is only one pathway to salvation among others. The difference, 
however, is that structural inclusivists nevertheless affirm non-Christian religions as 
salvific in that they see them as important frameworks or structures through which the 
salvation offered by Christ is made possible, while restrictivist inclusivists reject this 
idea by insisting on the necessity of an ‘epistemological relationship to Christ’ for 
salvation (D’Costa, 2009, 24). The problem with these views of interreligious 
relations, as Legenhausen himself criticizes, is that they see Christianity as inherently 
superior to other religions in the sense that the salvific power ascribed to it is believed 
to exceed that of other religions (Legenhausen, 2006, 36-37). Hence, it is arguable 
that Christian inclusivists, convinced that their religion has an advantage over all 
others (here in terms of its efficacy in guiding people to salvation), cannot promote a 
truly egalitarian view of religions, e.g. one that does not focus disproportionately on 
those aspects of religious belief that are central to the Christian tradition. Thus, one 
might offer the criticism that concepts of interreligious relations approaching other 
religions from an emic Christian perspective tend to overemphasize the role and 
significance of salvation as an aspect of religious belief without taking into account 
what other central spiritual ideas and goals might be found in non-Christian religions 
(e.g. different concepts of morality, liberation, truth). 
 
Of course, Legenhausen’s non-reductive pluralism and Christian inclusivism are not 
comparable in terms of their reference to the necessity of Christ’s incarnation for the 
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salvation of humankind. What is similar, however, is that they both attempt to solve 
the problem of diversity by adopting a soteriological perspective focusing primarily on 
the salvation of members of other faiths rather than on other spiritual dimensions 
such as matters of truth or practical experience. Thus, one might suggest that 
Legenhausen, like Christian inclusivists who hold that non-Christians can be saved 
even though the strict obligation of a personal belief in Christ is not fulfilled, promotes 
the soteriological theory that non-Muslims are potentially saved by the grace of God 
even though what Islam upholds as a strict obligation of faith (the belief in the Seal of 
Prophethood) is not fulfilled, either. Although Legenhausen’s pluralism has certainly 
the advantage of centering on a more general aspect of religious belief – the mystery 
of the divine – than Christian inclusivism (with its focus on Christ’s incarnation), which 
makes it accessible to non-Muslims without their having to adopt specifically Islamic 
doctrines or beliefs, it is still arguable that this inclusivist perspective on other 
religions, too, faces the charge of superiority.  
 
Pluralist theories incorporating traces of inclusivist thinking, Legenhausen himself 
objects, are not truly egalitarian and must therefore be seen as a form of degree 
pluralism (Legenhausen, 2006, 15; no date [a]). He explains this as follows: In 
contrast to equality pluralists (like Byrne), who are committed to saying that different 
religions, sharing one or more particular values, are equal in the degree to which they 
have these values, degree pluralists claim that ‘although each of several religions has 
some particular status, they do not have the status equally’ (Legenhausen, 2009, 11). 
Yet, this is also true of Legenhausen’s position. Given that only Islam enjoys the 
particular status of offering a guarantee for salvation, while all others ultimately 
depend on the mercy of God, it is evident that the salvific power of Islam is viewed by 
this form of pluralism as much more effective than that of other religions. 
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Fundamental differences in belief such as the Christian doctrine of incarnation as the 
only road to salvation, it is arguable then, cannot really be appreciated as equally 
respectable theories of salvation and must be graciously overlooked or ignored, 
instead. Furthermore, this theory is even considerably restricted in its scope in that it 
applies only to pre-Islamic Abrahamic religions that are believed to contain partial 
truth due to their special status as earlier revelations of the same divine message. 
Other religious traditions or spiritualties such as nontheist or polytheist religions, 
indigenous religions or simply younger religions and modern spiritualties that 
emerged after the foundation of Islam cannot participate in interfaith dialogue based 
on this narrow theoretical framework. Limiting the scope of applicability to such a 
great extent, we might therefore conclude, Legenhausen’s proposal is not a very 
satisfying corrective to Hick’s hypothesis. 
 
4.3. Objection 2: Legenhausen’s theory is not non-reductive – Religious 
differences as a result of “Christian incapability” 
Another reason why Legenhausen’s theory is not a thorough solution to the problem 
of difference is found in a closer analysis of the concept of qasir (the incapable) used 
as an important step in the argument. As we have seen, according to Legenhausen’s 
thesis, followers of Abrahamic religions other than Islam (Jews and Christians) can 
be saved by the grace of God despite their ignorance of specific Islam as the final 
revelation – in short: despite their “incorrect” beliefs. Yet, as indicated above, this rule 
does not apply equally to all infidels, but only to those whose incorrect beliefs are the 
result of incapability to accept Islam as their religion, for example because people 
growing up in Western cultures might adopt Christianity naturally as their religion 
without knowing that they ‘are making a mistake’ (Legenhausen, 2006, 111). Thus, 
Legenhausen specifies: ‘Jews and Christians, despite irreconcilable differences in 
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their beliefs with the teachings of Islam, may also be saved, provided that their 
incorrect belief is through no fault of their own’ (Legenhausen, no date, [a], my 
emphasis). In other words, what counts is not the incorrect belief in a religion other 
than Islam itself, but rather the reason for upholding this belief. Here, Shi’a theology 
distinguishes clearly between two concepts: qasir (the incapable) and muqqasir (the 
negligent). Drawing on Mutahhari’s modern interpretation of this concept, 
Legenhausen explains: 
‘[T]he threat of damnation is conditioned not merely on disbelief or incorrect belief, but 
on sinful disbelief or incorrect belief. Wrong belief is not sinful for those who are 
incapable (qasir), but only for the negligent (muqqasir) [those who know in the depths 
of their heart that Islam is true, but do not act in accordance with it]’ (Legenhausen, no 
date, [a]). 
 
 
This theory has interesting implications for the practice of interfaith dialogue. Since 
we cannot tell whether those who follow religions other than Islam are making that 
mistake ‘sinfully or excusably’ (for the answer to this question lies within the heart of 
the believer), Legenhausen claims, ‘where good relations with non-Muslims are 
possible without condoning injustice, the presumption of an honest mistake is morally 
incumbent upon us’ (Legenhausen, no date, [a]). On the basis of this principle, he 
concludes, Muslims living in Western contexts, for example, can engage in 
constructive dialogue and collaboration with Christians without having to ignore, for 
the sake of harmony, the significance of religious and cultural differences existing 
between them. 
 
Yet, this argument is inherently inconsistent. First, one might criticize that 
Legenhausen’s non-reductive pluralism does not appreciate differences between 
Muslims and Christians as something which is valuable in its own right, but merely as 
inevitable side-products of the “Christian incapability” of choosing the right religion. 
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Much in contrast to Sacks’s idea of religious differences as ‘a source of value and 
society’, Legenhausen simply sees them as mistakes, albeit ones that may be 
permissible if God wills. Moreover, viewing partners in dialogue as a priori limited in 
their capacities (whether cognitive, psychological, emotional or spiritual) destroys the 
atmosphere of respect necessary to create an egalitarian framework for interreligious 
collaboration. Even if Legenhausen’s theory allows for irreconcilable differences 
between religions, as he stresses so often, it is hard to see how it could ever provide 
motivation for genuine acceptance and respect for these differences, given the rather 
condescending attitudes towards non-Muslim religions and their particular 
characteristics involved in the argument. This leads us to the realization that 
Legenhausen’s theory is anything but non-reductive. Viewing religious differences as 
a product of “Christian incapability”, thereby implying that they would not exist, had all 
non-Muslims already discovered the truth of Islam, is tantamount to denying the very 
significance, if not reality, of the differences themselves: If a particular doctrine such 
as the Christian doctrine of incarnation, for example, is viewed by a Muslim 
participant in dialogue merely as a manifestation of incorrect faith, it is questionable 
how such a person would recognize the theological significance of this difference in 
belief and the role it might play in dialogue situations (e.g. as a topic for discussion 
whose consideration might further mutual knowledge and understanding).  
 
Regarding issues of difference, it is arguable then, Legenhausen’s theory is even 
more reductive than Hick’s pluralist hypothesis: Hick only reduces religious 
differences to the lowest common denominator – a shared belief in the Real an sich – 
without making a value judgment on how people interpret and express this belief; 
whereas Legenhausen sees differences as potentially excusable aberrations from 
the one and only true message of Islam. This, however, reduces the particularities 
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(specific beliefs, doctrines, practices) of non-Muslim religions to the level of falsity 
thereby ignoring the value those differences might have for people engaging with 
other religions in this multi-faith world. We may therefore conclude that 
Legenhausen’s proposal of a non-reductive religious pluralism, rooted in Islamic 
theology, ultimately fails to be non-reductive and thus cannot count as a successful 
solution to the problem of difference involved in reductive pluralisms. Still pursuing 
the search for a difference-respecting theory of interreligious relations, I shall 
therefore, in the next chapter, consider a few alternative approaches to interfaith 
dialogue that also involve pluralist thinking, but might be in a better position to truly 
appreciate differences. 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
Alternative approaches to Muslim-Christian dialogue: Towards a 
(religiously non-specific) model of witnessing 
 
 
5.1.  Sufi universalism and the principle of tawhid 
Given that Legenhausen’s attempt at curing religious pluralism of its incapacity to 
recognize religious differences as important resources for interfaith dialogue by 
offering a non-reductive version of it has failed, we might ask ourselves whether the 
pluralist approach as a whole is too flawed to be ever transformed into a difference-
respecting theory. Specifically, it seems, neither reductive nor non-reductive versions 
manage to bridge the gulf between insider and outsider perspectives on interfaith 
issues. While classical pluralisms (Hick, Panikkar, Knitter) try to adopt objective 
observer perspectives that do not value, sufficiently, the role that insider views must 
play in dialogue situations, Legenhausen’s theory, in the very attempt to be non-
reductive, slips back into inclusivist thinking thereby concentrating too much on 
potential attitudes to other religions found in a particular tradition (Shi’a Islam) without 
being open to other religious convictions. Although there is nothing wrong with the 
attempt at drawing on the particular theologies of Islam and Christianity when trying 
to establish a theoretical framework for constructive Muslim-Christian dialogue, it is 
questionable whether the positions developed by such religiously specific 
approaches will ever be general enough to apply to several traditions in the same 
way. To test this thesis (and to exclude the unlikely scenario that only theories based 
on Shi’a theology fail to recognize differences), this chapter will look at two other 
religiously specific approaches to interfaith dialogue provided by Sufism and 
Quakerism. These approaches, rooted in the mystic traditions of Islam and 
Christianity respectively are particularly promising candidates for the creation of a 
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difference-respecting theory for Muslim-Christian dialogue because – as we will see – 
they already incorporate, in one way or another, pluralist thinking as an integral part 
of their worldviews, while also staying committed to their own spiritual history. 
Drawing on the wisdom of the mystics, one might suggest, could therefore be an 
effective means of fusing emic and etic approaches into a new hybrid category of 
interfaith theories capable of recognizing the significance of difference within 
interreligious relations. 
 
The main difference between Sufi universalism and classical (reductive) pluralisms, 
when considered as potentially egalitarian frameworks for dialogue, is that Sufism 
traditionally sees religious diversity as divinely ordained as opposed to humanly 
constructed (Shah-Kazemi, 2006, xiv, xxv, 113-115). In The Other in the Light of the 
One (2006), Shah-Kazemi argues, for example, that the Qur’an ‘explicitly refers to the 
divine ordainment of religious diversity’ thereby ‘uphold[ing] the spiritual value of the 
diverse religious paths’ as ‘outwardly divergent facets of a single, universal revelation 
by the unique and indivisible Absolute’ (Shah-Kazemi, 2006, xiv-xv). He chooses 
verse V: 48 as an illustration13: 
 
‘For each We have appointed from you a Law and a Way. Had God willed, He could 
have made you one community. But in order that He might try you by that which He 
hath given you [He hath made you as you are]. So vie with one another in good 
works. Unto God ye will all return, and He will inform you of that wherein ye differed 
(in Shah-Kazemi, 2006, xv). 
 
 
At first glance, this view of religions as different paths to the same ultimate reality 
seems to be similar to the core idea of pluralism, but the difference between seeing 
diversity as divinely willed (as the Sufi hermeneutics applied here reveals) and seeing 
it as a cultural product (as Hick’s pluralism implies) is crucial: While Sufi universalists 
                                                            
13 Other Qur’anic passages that might be seen as proof‐texts for the divine ordainment of religious diversity are 
XLI: 43, XLII: 13 and II: 62. 
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claim that religions including their external forms are the result of distinct divine 
revelations offered by God to particular cultures at particular times, pluralists tend to 
regard them as culturally conditioned, human interpretations of the Absolute and 
hence, to some extent, as deviations from that which is beyond human description. 
As we have seen in chapters 2 and 3, pluralism – although certainly intended as an 
egalitarian view of religions, tries to make religions equally valuable by reducing their 
differences to a common core, which trivializes the particular and ultimately 
contradicts the Abrahamic belief in divine revelations. Sufi universalism, conversely, 
is capable of proclaiming ‘the necessity of dialogue’ in religiously diverse contexts 
without having to question, let alone deny, the legitimacy of this diversity in the first 
place (Shah-Kazemi, 2002, 154; 2006, 115). As Shah-Kazemi argues, Nasr’s 
universalism, for example (a perennial philosophy that he sees as largely identical 
with his own position) is founded ‘upon the complementarity between the particular 
forms and the universal essence of religion, and thus upholds the irreducible 
character – the divinely willed uniqueness – of each of the revealed religions’ (Shah-
Kazemi, 2006, 250). This approach, he therefore claims, is much more ‘respectful of 
real difference – in the face of an essential unity which transcends forms’ than Hick’s 
pluralism, which seeks to eliminate religious differences for the sake of an artificial 
unity that is inevitably vague and disloyal to the self-definition of individual traditions 
(Shah-Kazemi, 2006, 250). Universalism, in contrast, does not have this problem: 
Given that ‘a genuine receptivity to the underlying, universal substance of religion’ is 
not a hindrance to individual identity-formation and may also strengthen ‘the roots of 
one’s own particular tradition’, Shah-Kazemi argues, universalists are generally able 
to grant others the right to uphold the particularities of their own faith, while also 
remaining committed to their own spiritual heritage (Shah-Kazemi, 2006, 254, 256). 
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Shah-Kazemi’s interpretation of the principle of tawhid (the Islamic doctrine of the 
absolute oneness of God) is a key instrument within this view of religions. Drawing on 
al-Kashani’s classical ontological conception of tawhid, Shah-Kazemi defines this 
principle (commonly translated as “There is but one true God”) not only as the 
monotheistic declaration of the oneness of God to the exclusion of other deities, but 
also, and more fundamentally, as ‘the affirmation of a unique reality […] in relation to 
which all otherness is ultimately unreal’ (Shah-Kazemi, 2006, 75). This can be 
explained as follows: From a Sufi universalist perspective, the oneness of reality – a 
metaphysical principle incorporating both unity and multiplicity – does not exclude 
diversity, ‘but implies it, embraces it and integrates it’ without slipping into relativism 
(Shah-Kazemi, 2006, 75). Thus, it is arguable that tawhid excludes all relativity in the 
sense that it is absolute, but also includes all existence, however diverse it may be, 
because multiplicity is metaphysically contained within the absoluteness of the One 
(Shah-Kazemi, 2006, 88). In other words, tawhid is both ‘oneness in diversity’ and 
‘diversity in oneness’, thereby inviting all human beings to ‘contemplate the vision of 
the One in the many, and the many in the One’ (Shah-Kazemi, 2006, 88). From this 
position, interfaith dialogue may then be viewed in an entirely new light: Instead of 
being necessitated solely by external, non-spiritual, circumstances (the pluralist idea 
of religious diversity as a cultural product), dialogue between Muslims and Christians, 
for example, becomes something greater than a social duty: It is a desire for greater 
knowledge of the One revealed in the particular characteristics of both the other as 
well as oneself. This complex metaphysical theory certainly needs some reflection, 
but before evaluating it in terms of its difference-respecting qualities, I shall set it in 
relation to a similar view of religions found in Quakerism.  
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5.2.  Quakerism and the notion of “That of God in everyone” 
Contemporary Quakers or the Religious Society of Friends – identified by Woodhead 
as part of ‘Mystical Christianity’ (as opposed to ‘Church’ and ‘Biblical Christianity’14) –
consider themselves as a Christian denomination with relatively little dogmatic 
theology with the exception of the central unifying doctrine of the “priesthood of all 
believers”, the foundational concept of Protestantism derived from 1 Peter 2: 9 in the 
New Testament (Woodhead, 2004, 104). One fundamental idea within Quaker 
religious thought, however, that is sometimes even declared as ‘the Quakers’ creed’ 
is the notion of “That of God in everyone” or “That of God in every man”15 as it is 
traditionally worded (Benson, 1970, 21). As Benson explains, the idea that there is 
literally a bit of God in every man goes back to Fox’s interpretation of a passage in 
Romans 1 paraphrased by him as: ‘that which may be known of God is manifest in 
man, for God has showed it unto them’ (Fox, 1831, 55). “That of God”, Benson 
argues, can therefore be interpreted as the belief that ‘[i]n every man there is a 
witness for God that summons him to remember the Creator’ (Benson, 1970, 5). This 
“something of God” finds expression in quite a few metaphorical descriptions: It is a 
hunger for the knowledge of the Absolute put into man by the Divine; a voice, both 
personal and transcendent, that speaks to man and through him; or a light with which 
everyone that comes into the world is inherently enlightened, to mention but a few of 
the synonyms listed by Benson (Benson, 1970, 6, 13). What is important for our 
purpose, though, is to look at how “That of God”, believed to be dwelling in everyone, 
is to be answered from a Quaker perspective. According to Benson’s interpretation of 
                                                            
14 According  to Woodhead, Church Christianity comprises Catholicism, Anglicanism and Protestantism, which 
can  be  further  subdivided  into  conservative,  liberal  and  Pentecostal  strands  each  characterized  by  their 
respective understanding of authority as transcendent, rational and experiential; Biblical Christianity  includes 
Evangelicalism,  similarly  dividable  into  fundamental,  liberal  and  charismatic  movements;  and  Mystical 
Christianity  consists  of  Mystical  Eastern  Orthodoxy  (transcendent  authority),  Christian  Science  (rational 
authority) and finally Quakerism (experiential authority) (Woodhead, 2004, 104). 
15  The  gender‐specific  expression  of  “That  of  God  in  every man”  is  found,  for  example,  in  the works  and 
journals of George Fox, see for example Fox (1831) and Penney (ed.) (2007). 
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Fox, one way of answering the divine light in everyone is through trying to establish a 
unity among the believers, here, in the context of traditional Foxian theology: ‘a unity 
in the Christian community’, which Fox saw (in the seventeenth century), rather 
naively perhaps, as a place of only temporary diversity (Benson, 1970, 16). 
 
In the twentieth century, however, the notion of “That of God”, like Shah-Kazemi’s 
view of tawhid, has developed a more universalistic meaning, extending its 
application to all human beings as a means ‘to cultivate love and tolerance’ also in 
situations of ‘permanent diversity’ (Benson, 1970, 16). Thus, Jones writes in 1904 
that the ‘larger truth’ implicit in Fox’s works is that there is a ‘universal principle’ 
hidden in the notion of “That of God” that sees ‘something Divine, something of God’, 
in every human being regardless of which particular spiritual path, if any, the latter 
may follow (Jones in Benson, 1970, 18). This principle, like the concept of tawhid, 
may therefore be seen as a powerful means of establishing an egalitarian view of 
religions and of humanity itself, rooted in the universal ideas of respect, tolerance and 
peace. Thus, literature published by the American Friends Service Committee 
(AFSC16), for example, explicitly promotes the notion of “That of God” as the reason 
of our time for upholding the traditional Quaker attitude against the taking of human 
life in war and capital punishment17 (Benson, 1970, 19). The logic behind this 
argument is self-evident: If there is something Divine in all human beings, regardless 
of issues of race, gender, or belief, committing violence against any human being 
always amounts to violence against the very Divinity inherent in them, thereby 
                                                            
16 Here, Benson refers to the AFSC‐publication Who Shall live? (1970). 
17 More  information about the traditional Quaker attitude against violence can be found in the Quaker Peace 
Testimony of 1660, included in the online sources of chapter 7. A modern version of it, provided by the Guilford 
College, North Carolina, in 1967, is found in Durnbaugh (ed.) (1978), pp. 300‐305. 
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depriving those who commit violence of the opportunity to recognize and experience 
God in the Other.  
 
The concepts of human nature revealed in tawhid and “That of God”, one might 
suggest, are reminiscent of Buber’s reflections on the I-Thou relationship – an 
existentialist theory, influenced by Jewish mysticism (Hasidism), that sees the basis 
of human existence as ultimately dialogical (Buber, 2013). According to this theory, 
existence may be generally addressed in two ways: first, as the attitude of the I 
towards an it or intentional object that is separate in itself and may hence be used or 
experienced by the I (I-it relationship); and second, as the attitude of the I towards 
Thou, in which case the other is not separated from the I, thus enabling both to enter 
into genuine dialogue with each other (I-Thou relationship) (Buber, 2013, 6-9). Here, 
too, it is assumed that God, the ‘Eternal Thou’, reveals himself in the many human 
Thous, that is in the dialogical I-Thou relationship that exists between humans. 
Therefore, Buber argues, human life finds meaningfulness not in the I (individual 
existence) but ‘between the I and Thou’ (community) – the place where God is most 
readily encountered (Buber, 2013, 39). This, it is arguable, makes a strong case for a 
human solidarity stretching beyond religious boundaries. Buber writes in this context: 
‘The free man is he who […] believes in the real solidarity of the real twofold entity I 
and Thou (Buber, 2013, 59). For this reason, he argues, the dialogical I-Thou 
relationship is the only relation in the world where exclusiveness and inclusiveness 
are truly reconciled: Only in the relation with God, experienced through the other, 
unconditioned exclusiveness (found in the ‘realm of separation’ where the other is 
treated as an intentional object instead of a Thou) and unconditioned inclusiveness 
(the dissolution of all individualization) are ‘one and the same, in which the whole 
universe is implied’ (Buber, 2013, 23, 99). Drawing on the wisdom of the mystics 
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(whether Jewish, Christian or Muslim), this analysis suggests, could therefore truly be 
a valuable resource for constructive interfaith dialogue aimed at conciliation and 
solidarity. 
 
Yet, the problem with this approach, as indicated above, is that it is too specific in its 
spiritual orientation (mysticism) to be made normative in dialogue situations between 
Christians and Muslims. Although both traditions, Sufism and Quakerism, due to their 
particular esoteric understandings of human nature, certainly have the potential to 
mediate identities of people from different faiths by fusing insider and outsider 
perspectives into a new metaphysical whole, it is the very particularity of those 
traditions themselves that ultimately limits the applicability of their concepts of 
interreligious relations. Thus, it is arguable that Islamic mysticism, with its constant 
stress on iman (the esoteric as opposed to exoteric aspects of Islam) is too restricted 
in its spiritual focus to include the perspectives of orthodox Muslims, who might 
simply not share the same esoteric worldview. Similarly, in the case of Christianity, 
conservative Catholics, for example, characterized by a belief in ‘transcendent 
authority’, might find the idea of “That of God in everyone” – an obvious expression of 
‘experiential authority’ – rather strange, which could make them unwilling to even 
consider it as a basis for interfaith dialogue (Woodhead, 2004, 104).  Using the 
insights of Sufi universalism or Quakerism as normative theories of interreligious 
relations, it is evident then, would not do justice to the diversity that exists both 
between, but also within individual religions and sometimes even within particular 
branches of these traditions. Here, one might point to the fact that neither evangelical 
nor traditional conservative Quaker understandings of Christianity are fully 
compatible with the aforementioned liberal interpretation of “That of God”, found in 
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the context of the ‘enlightened Christian Platonism’ of the twentieth century (Benson, 
1970, 18).  
 
Another criticism one might raise against the use of tawhid and “That of God” as 
universal principles of interfaith relations is that both positions obviously assume the 
existence of a single deity, thereby implying the truth of monotheism without taking 
into account how polytheist and nontheist religions could be included in this view of 
religions. Even if the insights offered by Sufism and Quakerism have the potential to 
enrich dialogue between followers of monotheist religions, it is difficult to see how 
they could ever be useful outside those traditions. Seeing religiously specific 
concepts like these as universally applicable, we might therefore conclude, would in 
itself be a case of ignoring the significance of religious diversity (external and 
internal) within interreligious relations. This suggests that interfaith dialogue, to be 
truly sensitive to issues of difference, might need neither an objective pluralist 
framework, ignorant of emic perspectives on (inter-)faith issues, nor a religiously 
specific approach, which is insufficiently objective, but simply a combination of both 
approaches. The last two sections of this chapter will therefore introduce as a 
difference-respecting alternative what I term the “model of witnessing”, based on the 
framework of minimal ethical pluralism. 
 
 
5.3. A (religiously non-specific) model of witnessing 
The main advantage of using the idea of being a witness to one’s own faith as a 
fundamental principle for interfaith dialogue is that the act of witnessing has a 
uniquely individual character – in that it allows religious adherents to present and 
value their own emic perspectives on (inter-)faith issues – without necessarily 
crossing the line to exclusivism or proselytism. Muslims living in minority contexts 
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such as Western plural societies, for instance, when considering themselves as 
witnesses of Islam, have the opportunity of living authentically as Muslims in non-
Muslim contexts thus transforming the shahada (the testimony of faith through the 
formulation of “I bear witness that there is no god but God and that Muhammad is His 
prophet”’18) as part of everyday life and religious practice. In Western Muslims and 
the Future of Islam (2004), Ramadan argues, for example, that this testimony of faith, 
based on verse 16: 12519 in the Qur’an and traditionally understood as a call to Islam, 
need not be interpreted as ‘a matter of wanting to convert, because people’s hearts 
are God’s domain’, but rather as ‘a matter of bearing witness, which is an invitation to 
remember and meditate’ (Ramadan, 2004, 2008). Drawing on verse 2: 143, 
Ramadan therefore urges Western Muslims ‘to bear witness’, with their lives, ‘to the 
truth before mankind’ thereby establishing a view of interreligious dialogue as ‘a 
meeting of “witnesses” who are seeking to live their faiths’, sharing their convictions 
and ‘engag[ing] with one another for a more humane, more just world, closer to what 
God expects of humanity’ (Ramadan, 2004, 208).  
 
Thus, he replaces the traditional Islamic dualism, dividing the world into dar al-Islam 
(abode of Islam), and dar al-harb (abode of war) – by militant Muslims sometimes 
associated with the West – with the single, unifying category of dar al-shahada 
(abode of testimony) (Ramadan, 2004, 72). Instead of interpreting the West as the 
‘world of infidels’ as literalist interpretations of Islam suggest, he claims, Western 
Muslims who see themselves as witnesses of Islam, ‘positive and sure of 
themselves’, have the responsibility to ‘remind the people around themselves of God 
                                                            
18 The shahada  is  the  first of  the Five Pillars of  Islam and may be viewed as  ‘the  foundation  […] of “being a 
Muslim” (Ramadan, 2004, 257). 
19 Qur’an 16: 125: ‘Call [invite] to the path of your Lord using wisdom and good exhortation, and debate with 
them in the best of manner’ (in Ramadan, 2004, 208). 
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and spirituality’; and when it comes to social issues, they are called by the shahada 
to be ‘actively involved in supporting values and morality, justice and solidarity’ 
(Cesari, 2004, 171; Ramadan, 2004, 73). Yet, this does not mean that they have to 
give up their own identity and passively submit to their environment: Once their 
position as witnesses is secure, Muslims – no matter where they are in the world – 
can live their lives authentically as reflections of their personal beliefs and 
convictions, thereby becoming ‘a positive influence’ within the unified world of 
testimony (Ramadan, 2004, 73). Using the idea of witnessing as a basis for interfaith 
dialogue, one might therefore conclude, opens new horizons, in which shared 
spiritual insights as well the unshared particularities of individual faiths are 
recognized and appreciated as authentic expressions of varying religious and cultural 
identities. 
 
It is important to note, though, that the concept of witnessing, although considered 
here from a Muslim viewpoint, is in itself religiously non-specific and can hence be 
utilized by adherents of any religious tradition. In contrast to Legenhausen’s Shi’a 
version of pluralism, Sufi universalism, or modern liberal Quakerism, whose spiritual 
outlooks are clearly rooted in the respective theologies of these traditions, models of 
witnessing are religiously neutral and do not invite certain groups of believers to the 
exclusion of others. Another advantage, as Ramadan’s reflections reveal, is that the 
idea of witnessing is clearly distinguished from proselytism, while nonetheless 
offering room for the expression of insider views of religious adherents. Thus, it is 
arguable that even though the boundaries between witnessing and proselytism may 
sometimes appear to be blurry, the two issues are sufficiently distinct in the following 
sense: While proselytism is a conscious attempt to convert others to one’s own 
religion and is therefore carried out for this reason only, bearing witness (as I 
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understand it) is an act of interreligious engagement that sees expressing and 
sharing one’s spiritual convictions as an end in itself enabling people from different 
faiths to understand and learn from one another. 
 
This differentiates the model of witnessing from Sufi universalism. As Shah-Kazemi 
specifies, the universalism promoted by him can also be seen as a form of da’wa, the 
Islamic concept of proselytism, translated literally as “call to Islam” (Shah-Kazemi, 
2010, 234). For him, universalism ‘is a way of resolving [the] outward incompatibility’ 
between da’wa and the possible Muslim view of interfaith dialogue as a ‘regrettable 
necessity, occasioned by a world in which power and wealth just happen to be 
concentrated in the hands of non-Muslims’ (Shah-Kazemi, 2010, 235). The reason 
why da’wa and interfaith dialogue are reconcilable in universalism, he argues, is that 
the specific hermeneutics of Sufism promoted by him enables Muslims: 
 
‘to present an `invitation´ to study the universality that is undoubtedly present in the 
Qur’an, together with the profound Sufi perspectives on key Qur’anic verses, as a 
most – possibly the most – effective and appropriate manner in which to `call` to 
Islam’ (Shah-Kazemi, 2010, 235). 
 
 
Confusing interfaith dialogue with proselytism, however, is problematic because it 
reintroduces the logic of superiority, involved in exclusivism, inclusivism and degree 
pluralism, into the sphere of dialogue. The model of witnessing, by contrast, remains 
much more neutral in that it offers room for the expression of our innermost spiritual 
beliefs without prompting us to persuade others of these convictions or encouraging 
us to engage in the rather divisive practice of apologetics. People who regard 
interreligious dialogue as an extension of their missionary activities or simply as a 
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chance to engage in positive apologetics20, it might further be argued, focus their 
attention too much on their side of the debate, thus being unable to appreciate 
differences as potential sources of spiritual contemplation or ways of learning from 
one another. 
 
This shows that models of witnessing do not only have an advantage over religiously 
specific approaches, but also, and more significantly, over theories of religious 
pluralism. Despite their capacity to approach interfaith issues objectively – an aim 
also shared by pluralism – such models clearly do not have to reduce differences to a 
common core to produce a vague unity that ultimately ignores the significance of the 
particularities of religious traditions. Offering room for the expression of insider 
perspectives of different religions while being religiously non-specific enough to give 
equal status to these views without encouraging proselytism or apologetics, the 
model of witnessing bridges, in fact, the gulf between emic and etic perspectives 
created by other approaches very effectively. One of the reasons why this is the case 
is that bearing witness to one’s own faith while also listening to the testimonies of 
others requires from participants in dialogue the development of a special quality: 
Apart from the neutral exchange of information (on the basis of which participants 
would not enter into any real relationship, but engage in interreligious dialogue only 
cognitively) the act of witnessing requires from them an important perspective 
exchange, both cognitive and affective. Van der Ven explains this as follows: By 
means of this ‘socioemotional disposition’ people may ‘switch to the perspective of 
the other and […] experience and interpret situations, other people, and themselves 
the way in which the other would’ (Van der Ven, 2006, 435). Thus, they are able to 
                                                            
20 Positive apologetics is defined by Griffiths as ‘a discourse designed to show that the ordered set of doctrine‐
expressing sentences constituting a particular religious community’s doctrines  is cognitively superior, in some 
important respect(s), to that constituting another religious community’s doctrines’ (Griffiths, 1991, 14). 
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‘understand, comprehend, and appreciate the other’s desires, intentions, hopes, and 
expectations from that person’s perspective, which makes them ‘sensitive to their 
goals, disappointment and aims’ (Van der Ven, 2006, 435). Given that both 
perspectives (the self-perspective and the other perspective) are necessarily 
participant perspectives, as opposed to observer perspectives, Van der Ven argues, 
both partners, by proceeding from their own participant view and trying to adopt the 
other’s, automatically aim at ‘mutual participation’ (Van der Ven, 2006, 436). Fusing 
insider and outsider perspectives in this way without ignoring the particularities of 
individual views, we might therefore conclude, the model of witnessing is a much 
more recommendable basis for interfaith dialogue than religiously specific 
approaches or reductive pluralisms. 
 
5.4.  The model of witnessing combined with minimal ethical pluralism 
The conclusion that models of witnessing are better frameworks for interfaith 
dialogue than pluralist theories, however, does not entail that the concept of pluralism 
itself is of no use in dialogue situations. Just because pluralist conceptions of 
interreligious relations, due to their unique unifying tendencies, have the 
disadvantage of underestimating the significance of difference when used as the only 
theoretical framework for interfaith dialogue, does not mean that they cannot 
complement models already sensitive to issues of difference. Specifically, one might 
claim, ethical pluralisms – when embedded in the religiously non-specific theory of 
witnessing – have the potential to increase our awareness of similarities that exist 
between the moral ideals of different religions without having to use, as their main 
frame of reference, only those values found in a particular tradition. Thus, I have 
argued in chapter 3, the global ethics projects initiated by Küng, Knitter or Ruland are 
not doomed to failure because there is no such thing to be found in the world 
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religions as a shared basic morality, but simply because the vision promoted by them 
– the emergence of a critical corporate conscience rooted in a global network of 
shared moral ideals – is somewhat too big to be put into practice. For this reason, 
Ruland’s appeal for a global virtue ethics, viewed by him as the ideal motivation for 
interreligious collaboration, faces the charge of Eurocentricism as it appears to 
universalize the moral ideals of Western liberalism (e.g. the rights and freedoms 
established in the UDHR) into ‘a conscience across borders’ (Ruland, 2002). 
Therefore, to benefit from the unifying power of ethical pluralism without risking 
disregard of the potential cultural particularity of moral standards, it is sensible to 
combine our model of witnessing with a version of pluralism that is somewhat weaker 
than the theories provided by classical ethical pluralists.  
 
One set of virtues on which this “minimal ethical pluralism”, as I would call it, could 
center are the principles of mutual hospitality and potential friendship, already 
examined in the context of Ford’s presentation of Scriptural Reasoning. Like 
participants in interfaith study groups, focusing on scriptural study, members of 
interfaith projects who see themselves as witnesses to their own faith, whether 
engaged in general philosophical/ethical discussion or specific intra-communal 
debates, may thus acknowledge the sacredness of the others’ beliefs and practices 
without having to aim at a consensus that might gloss over differences or avoid 
argument in the first place. This hospitality, based on politeness and mutual trust, 
Ford argues, possesses the potential to turn into friendship and might therefore be 
‘the most tangible anticipation of future peace’ (Ford, 2006, 350). Another moral 
ideal, which is not culture-specific and could hence be used as a basis for a shared 
minimal virtue ethics, is humility. Schillinger argues that Christian and Muslim 
understandings of the concept of humility (although differing in their particular 
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theological interpretations revealed, for example, in the classical accounts of humility 
of Clairvaux and Al-Ghazali respectively) share a common underlying structure 
relating to the practice of interfaith dialogue in important ways (Schillinger, 2012, 
364). On both accounts, he argues, humility curtails ‘the self’s intellectual pride’ thus 
possibly creating in participants in dialogue an ‘improved ability to understand and 
appreciate others’ points of view’ and ‘making space for their flourishing’ (Schillinger, 
2012, 372). Yet, given that the concept of humility itself is not objective-oriented (e.g. 
it is not necessarily linked to egalitarianism), it is open enough to invite members of 
different traditions – and branches of traditions – to engage in interreligious 
exchanges in intellectually humble ways without having to give up their own particular 
views of interreligious relations (exclusivist, inclusivist, pluralist, etc.) (Schillinger, 
2012, 379). 
 
The model of witnessing, especially when combined with minimal ethical pluralism, 
one might argue as a final step in this discussion, is capable of motivating joint 
action. Instead of encouraging proselytism (as religiously specific approaches tend to 
do), members of interfaith projects who consider themselves as witnesses to their 
own faith, might for example use the power and insights of witnessing to respond not 
only in spiritually, but also socially and politically adequate ways to particular events 
or conflicts, both local and global, that challenge religious communities today. The 
Clapham and Stockwell Faith Forum in England, albeit not explicitly based on the 
idea of witnessing, might be used as a practical example here: In ‘Facing Challenges 
Together’ (2008), Robertson explains that this local multi-faith group, consisting of 
Christians, Muslims, Jews and Hindus, has the primary purpose to ‘bring together 
people of all faiths and none’ to respond collectively to both world events and local 
concerns (Robertson, 2008, 35). After the London bombings on July 7 in 2005 and 
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the Stockwell shooting21 two weeks later, for instance, members of the faith forum 
tried to find a united response, or a joint statement, capable of ‘defy[ing] the bombers’ 
attempt to create divisions’ between different faith communities (Robertson, 2008, 
37). They decided to translate their chosen statement – ‘No act of aggression will 
break us apart’ – into symbolic form by creating a ‘peace mala rope22’ to be held in a 
circle by people from different faiths during public events as a demonstration of their 
unity and as an invitation for others to join in (Robertson, 2008, 38-9). Yet, in contrast 
to reductive pluralist attempts at creating unity among the religions by reducing 
differences to a common core, this particular act, despite its obviously unifying force, 
can be seen as a difference-respecting practice. When faced with the proposition to 
simply hold hands in a circle as a symbol of harmony, one Muslim member of this 
group objected that such an act might keep many Muslims from joining in because 
men holding hands with women is not always permitted in Islam (Robertson, 2008, 
38). The particular choice of a rope as a unifying symbol, one might therefore 
suggest, can be seen as a result of respecting the testimony of faith (here regarding 
issues of gender separation within Islam) of a particular individual. Here, too, the 
notion of friendship seems to have played an important role as the following 
statement reported by Robertson reveals: ‘[If we held] hands in a circle to show our 
strength and solidarity, […] it would be impossible for our Muslim friends to join in’ 
(Robertson, 2008, 38, my emphasis). Interfaith models based on the idea of 
witnessing, combined with a minimal virtue ethics centering on the notions of humility, 
hospitality and above all, friendship, we may therefore conclude, solve the problem of 
                                                            
21 On  July 22  in 2005,  the Brazilian Menezes, misidentified as one of  the  fugitives  involved  in  the attempted 
bombings of  July 21, was shot dead by a police officer of  the London Metropolitan police at Stockwell  tube 
station. 
22 Mala is the word used by Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists for prayer beads (Robertson, 2008, 37). 
69 
 
difference involved in classical pluralisms more effectively than the religiously specific 
approaches of Sufism, Quakerism or Legenhausen’s Shi’a position. 
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Chapter 6 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
The overall aim of this research was to clarify whether Legenhausen’s non-reductive 
corrective to Hick’s pluralist hypothesis is a successful solution to the problem of 
difference within interreligious relations, which would make it a difference-respecting 
and perhaps, recommendable theoretical basis for constructive interfaith dialogue. 
The specific research objectives were: 
 
 to summarize and examine pluralist positions, both as approaches to interfaith 
dialogue and as concepts of religion, concentrating particularly on Hick’s 
pluralist hypothesis and its implications for the study of religions. 
 to identify and evaluate critically objections against such pluralist positions, 
especially the problem of difference involved in Hick’s pluralism. 
 to introduce Legenhausen’s non-reductive pluralism as a possible solution to 
this problem and hence, a potential corrective to Hick’s position. 
 to examine the extent to which this Islamic version of pluralism differs from 
Christian inclusivism and its tendency towards claims of spiritual superiority. 
 to formulate recommendations on interfaith issues such as the promotion of a 
specific model for interfaith dialogue, sensitive to issues of difference. 
 
This section will revisit the five research objectives above, summarize the findings of 
the project and offer conclusions based on these findings. Recommendations specific 
to the evidence presented in the critical analysis as well as suggestions for future 
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research will be discussed; and the contribution of this research to the field of 
interfaith dialogue will be clarified. By adopting this structure it is intended that the 
research will be concluded so as to reflect on whether or not the individual research 
objectives have been met, including consideration of the value of this study. 
 
6.2. Research objectives: Summary of findings and conclusions 
Concerning research objectives 1 and 2, the literature review identified as a major 
objection against classical pluralisms that these approaches tend to ignore the 
significance of difference within interreligious relations (MacIntyre, 1985; MacGrane 
1989).  As a primary reason for this lack of consideration it was specified that unitary 
pluralisms like Hick’s theory typically reduce religious differences to a common core 
(here: a shared basic belief in the noumenal Real) to create a unity among the world 
religions consciously transcending the particularities of individual traditions. 
Moreover, the closer analysis of Hick’s pluralism in chapters 2 and 3 revealed that 
the specific view of religions as varying human interpretations of the one, ineffable 
Real, inherent in this theory, opens the door to cultural and religious relativism 
thereby failing to take otherness seriously (MacGrane, 1989; Van der Ven, 2006; 
Legenhausen, 2006, 2009). Similarly, with regard to the global ethics projects offered 
by Küng, Knitter or Ruland, it was argued that ethical pluralisms, envisioning a global 
ethical conscience stretching across religious boundaries, face the charge of moral 
universalism and hence might be viewed as theories incapable of recognizing the 
potential cultural particularity of moral values. Following Sacks’s argumentation for 
the introduction of a new religious paradigm designed to replace both tribalism and 
universalism – the dignity of difference – chapter 3 therefore concluded that interfaith 
dialogue should no longer be viewed as a practice focusing primarily on similarities 
between religions, but rather as the art of reconciling difference. This, however, it was 
72 
 
specified, is difficult to achieve when dialogue is based on the theoretical frameworks 
of classical pluralisms. As Van der Ven’s emic Christian reflections on dialogue with 
other religions revealed, pluralist theories – intent on providing an egalitarian account 
of religions – attempt to examine religious traditions from an exclusive observer 
perspective thus paying little attention to insider views on (inter-)faith issues and the 
potential particularities in belief and practice that they reveal. 
 
Concerning research objectives 3 and 4, the critical analysis undertaken in chapter 4 
showed that Legenhausen’s Shi’a version of pluralism, designed as a non-reductive 
corrective to Hick’s hypothesis and other reductive pluralisms, fails to solve the 
problem of difference and thus cannot be counted among the difference-respecting 
theories of interreligious relations. The first objection brought against Legenhausen 
was that his pluralism, based on the Shi’a principle of the general limitlessness of 
God’s grace, is ultimately connected to (Christian) inclusivism in that it adopts the 
soteriological perspective that non-Muslims (mostly Jews and Christians) are 
potentially saved by the grace of God even though what Islam regards as a strict 
obligation of faith – the belief in the Seal of Prophethood – is not fulfilled by them. 
Although it was claimed that this view of interreligious relations is an improvement 
over Christian inclusivism because it centers on a more general aspect of religious 
belief (the mystery of the Divine) and is therefore accessible to non-Muslims without 
their having to adopt specifically Islamic doctrines, it sees non-Muslims as 
maintaining “incorrect” beliefs and hence cannot overcome the problem of superiority 
involved in inclusivism. On the basis of this way of thinking, it was further argued, 
fundamental differences in belief that undoubtedly exist between Muslims and 
Christians (such as varying understandings of the oneness of God) cannot truly be 
recognized by Muslims as equally valuable theological interpretations and must be 
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graciously overlooked instead. It was therefore concluded that Legenhausen’s 
proposal of an Islamic, non-reductive version of pluralism, like unitary and ethical 
pluralisms, ultimately fails to appreciate cultural and religious differences as 
invaluable resources for interfaith dialogue. 
 
This led us to another, rather unexpected conclusion, namely that Legenhausen’s 
theory, although presuming to provide motivation for tolerance without having to 
reduce irreconcilable differences to the lowest common denominator, cannot really 
be viewed as a non-reductive theory of interreligious relations. The reason for this, as 
the second objection revealed, can be found in the concept of qasir (the incapable) 
used as a premise in Legenhausen’s argument: Although Christians can be saved by 
the grace of God despite their “incorrect” beliefs in a religion other than Islam 
(according to this view of religions), this rule only applies to those “infidels” who are 
incapable of accepting Islam as their religion (e.g. because they have adopted the 
religious system dominant in their culture without knowing that they are ‘making a 
mistake’) and whose ‘wrong beliefs’ are therefore ‘not sinful’. Yet, seeing differences 
in belief and practice merely as a product of “Christian incapability” rather than divine 
ordinance, for example, it was argued, ignores both the significance and the reality of 
those differences and hence does not produce a theory of interreligious relations that 
is truly aware of issues of difference and the roles they might play in dialogue 
situations. It was therefore concluded that in contrast to classical unitary and ethical 
pluralisms, underestimating the significance of emic perspectives on interfaith issues, 
this religiously specific approach, rooted in Shi’a theology, ascribes too much value to 
insider views, which makes it vulnerable to the charge of superiority. 
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6.3. Recommendations 
In order to meet the final objective, chapter 5 was concerned with providing an 
alternative, difference-respecting, framework for interreligious dialogue that bridges 
the gulf between emic and etic perspectives produced by the theories examined 
above. Yet, to exclude the possibility that other religiously specific approaches to 
Muslim-Christian dialogue (not rooted in Shi’a Islam) might have the capacity to solve 
the problem of difference, this chapter provided first an analysis of two more emic 
Muslim/Christian views of religions – Sufi universalism and Quakerism and their 
mystical interpretations of the relation between oneness and multiplicity revealed in 
the principles of tawhid and “That of God in everyone”. This led us to the conclusion 
that even though both traditions certainly have the potential to fuse insider and 
outsider views into a new metaphysical whole, they are ultimately too specific in their 
spiritual focus (mysticism) to be accepted as normative theories by a wide range of 
religions or even branches of individual traditions. Viewing religiously specific 
approaches like these as universally applicable, it was therefore concluded, does not 
do justice to the great diversity that exists both between and within religions.  
 
As a final step, chapter 5 therefore recommended as an alternative approach to 
combine the best aspects of pluralism and religiously specific approaches into a new 
model for interfaith dialogue respectful of differences. Thus, it was argued that a 
model based on the notion of witnessing, like Ramadan’s idea of shahada, has the 
advantage of offering room for an authentic expression of insider views on (inter-
)faith issues without encouraging divisive practices such as proselytism or 
apologetics. Being in itself religiously non-specific, this model of witnessing provides 
a theoretical framework that is open enough to be adopted by members of different 
religions (and those coming from opposite ends of the spectra of individual traditions) 
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without their having to give up potentially conflicting truth claims or personal 
convictions. For it to have a unifying power similar to classical pluralisms, however, it 
was further recommended to combine the model of witnessing with a minimal ethical 
pluralism based on the virtues of humility, hospitality and friendship. These virtues, 
taken from Schillinger’s and Ford’s considerations and viewed here as culturally 
unspecific in their general interpretation, were chosen to avoid the charge of moral 
universalism that classical ethical pluralisms face. The overall conclusion drawn in 
this research was therefore that the model of witnessing, combined with a minimal 
virtue ethics like this one, has similar advantages as classical pluralisms (in that it 
motivates interreligious collaboration, for example) while also being capable of 
appreciating differences as important resources for interfaith dialogue.  
 
It is important to note, though, that this presentation of a two-fold approach to 
interfaith dialogue, consisting of the components of witnessing and minimal ethical 
pluralism, is just the beginning of a search for a difference-respecting theory of 
interreligious relations capable, perhaps, of replacing Race’s threefold typology. 
Specifically, the idea of a minimal virtue ethics, based on a fixed set of culturally 
unspecific, yet globally shared, moral principles, needs substantial interdisciplinary 
research to be put into practice. To take this study forward, it is therefore suggested 
to undertake further research (within the fields of religious studies, theology, 
philosophy of religion, sociology, cultural studies) examining the possibility of minimal 
ethical pluralism as a partial solution to the problem of difference. 
 
6.4. Contribution to knowledge and concluding remarks 
This research has contributed to knowledge in two main ways: First, as the literature 
review revealed, there is a significant lack of research focusing on the area of non-
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reductive pluralism. Even though non-reductive approaches to interfaith issues are 
sometimes mentioned or even implicitly recommended as a basis for interreligious 
dialogue today (as Barnes’s chapter in the Routledge Companion to the Study of 
Religion suggests), the only non-reductive theory actually written out so far – 
Legenhausen’s proposal – has not been sufficiently explored. The two objections 
brought against Legenhausen in this research project can therefore be viewed as 
partly original in the sense that objection 1 (establishing a link between 
Legenhausen’s pluralism and inclusivism) investigates, in a more detailed way, what 
Barnes only hints at in his chapter on pluralism; and in the sense that objection 2 (the 
realization that Legenhausen’s position is not non-reductive) ultimately evolves out of 
these considerations. The second way, in which this research contributes to 
knowledge is found in the way in which it makes specific recommendations on 
interfaith issues. While most of the existing theories, trying to provide an egalitarian 
account of religions, seem to aspire to be universal solutions to the problem of 
religious diversity, this research has argued that a combination of different 
approaches, seeing religious pluralism more as a complement to other models rather 
than an independent framework, might be a better way forward. This has the 
advantage that classical pluralisms, even if underestimating the significance of 
difference, can still be ascribed an important role within interreligious relations. When 
combined with the model of witnessing – already offering sufficient room for an 
authentic expression and appreciation of insider views on interfaith issues – a small 
proportion of disregard in matters of differences in belief, doctrine and practice (the 
extent of which is secured by a minimal virtue ethics) may no longer be such a 
drawback. 
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